ARTICLES
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE HUMAN
GENOME
Barbara J. Evans∗
Today, we celebrate the revelation of the first draft of the human book of
1
life.
2
Today, we are learning the language in which God created life.

INTRODUCTION
The metaphor of the human genome as the Book of Life already
was in wide use before June 26, 2000 when Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, and President Bill Clinton spoke these words at a White House gathering to
celebrate the Human Genome Project. A search of the phrase “human genome book of life” in the National Library of Medicine’s
PubMed database yields thirty-one hits in the peer-reviewed scientific
3
literature, including an anthropological study of how the “Book of
4
Life” metaphor evolved in the popular press between 1990 and 2002.
As sometimes happens in history, the revelation of a new sacred text
devolved into spats about who is good enough to read it: Specifically,
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Iina Hellsten, From Sequencing to Annotating: Extending the Metaphor of the Book of Life from
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is it wrong to grant ordinary laypeople direct access to the genomic
Book of Life? This echoes a theme from the English Protestant
Reformation, when there was consternation about translating the Bible into vernacular (English-language) text that laypeople could read
5
6
for themselves. Sharing genetic test results directly with test subjects
stirs similar sentiments.
“[A] substantial debate has erupted over whether to offer research
participants individual research results, especially in genetic and ge7
nomic research.” The question here is whether people who volunteer to serve as participants in genetic research should be able to
learn the results of the experimental genetic tests that investigators
performed on them. Another debate concerns direct-to-consumer
(“DTC”) genetic tests that individuals can order directly from a la8
boratory without having a physician act as an intermediary. A third
and larger debate concerns the very future of clinical medicine: Will
the U.S. healthcare industry continue its “disease-oriented, reactive,
9
and sporadic approach to care” in which medical professionals attempt to summon miracles to redeem patients after their descent into
10
illness, or will it shift to a model of “prospective medicine” that harnesses patients’ genetic and other diagnostic information in a lifelong, sustained journey to keep them well? This latter mode—also
known as “P4 Medicine (Predictive, Preventive, Personalized, and
11
Participatory)” —envisions a “far greater role for patient involve12
ment” in a continuous process of risk assessment, health promotion,

5
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See generally JAMES SIMPSON, BURNING TO READ: ENGLISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS
REFORMATION OPPONENTS 2 (2007) (discussing the development, during the period
1520–1547, of a liberal reading culture in which individual religious adherents began to
read holy scriptures for themselves without mediation by the clergy).
This Article uses the term “test subject” to refer to a person who has undergone laboratory testing either as a patient or as a research participant. A test subject is simply a person
who has been tested with a genetic or other in vitro diagnostic test, either in a clinical or
research setting.
Susan M. Wolf, The Challenge of Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216, 216 (2008);
see also discussion and literature review infra Part II.
See, e.g., Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genomic
Services in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475, 476–77 (2012) (discussing the challenges of regulating DTC genetic tests).
Ralph Snyderman & Ziggy Yoediono, Perspective: Prospective Health Care and the Role of Academic Medicine: Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way, 83 ACAD. MED. 707, 707 (2008).
Id. (defining prospective health care as personalized, predictive, preventive, and participatory medicine).
INST. FOR SYS. BIOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORT: PUSHING BOUNDARIES 2 (2010) (report of Dr.
Leroy Hood).
Snyderman & Yoedino, supra note 9, at 707.
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and disease minimization. Greater patient involvement entails giving
patients greater access to information than they have had in the past.
The common thread in all of these debates is that they are disputes about permissible flows of information from genetic and other
diagnostic tests. Specifically, may a party (such as an investigator or a
laboratory) that possesses a person’s genetic test results communicate
them to the test subject, or does law channel the communication
through intermediaries or, perhaps, censor or suppress it altogether?
Advances in the life sciences are “catalyzing a revolution in
13
healthcare focused around an informational view of medicine.” Old
14
laws from the past constrain flows of genetic information and, in doing so, threaten this revolution. This Article explores whether the
First Amendment can help clear away old laws that limit genomic
speech.
Now, as in the Reformation, “[m]odernity and reading are intimately bound; the formation of one powerful strand of modernity in
the sixteenth century was, in good part, produced by a profound
15
transformation in the way Europeans read.” The emergence of a
liberal reading culture—premised on the capacity of individuals to
read and debate the meaning of their sacred texts freely, directly, and
unconstrained by intermediaries and institutional disciplines—was a
16
“foundational element” of our modern understanding of ourselves.
Construction of the human genome—the process of coming to an
understanding of what the Book of Life means—is fundamental to our
future self-understanding. Recent battles over access to genetic information are fights about who is entitled to have a go at construing
17
the genome’s meaning. “Books can unleash terrific energies” and
the human genome is no exception. People want to read it.
There is a fairly broad consensus among bioethicists and state and
federal regulators that scientific investigators’ communication of genetic test results to research participants should be subject to prior
review and content-based restrictions on what the participants can be
18
told. The recommended restrictions often include outright bans on
the return of results that are scientifically uncertain, that lack a wellestablished clinical or reproductive significance, or that reveal risks

13
14
15
16
17
18

INST. FOR SYS. BIOLOGY, supra note 11, at 2.
See discussion infra Part I.
SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 10.
See discussion infra Part II (discussing bioethical concerns about the return of results) and
infra Part I (discussing legal restrictions on the return of results).
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about which little can be done given the limitations of current medi19
cal knowledge. Yet, many research participants are curious about
their genomes and want to know what researchers found out about
20
them. Investigators may feel strongly inclined to answer their questions whether out of civility, fear of liability, or respect for the research participants, but they worry that doing so would violate a
complex web of laws and regulations that restrict the return of exper21
imental test results.
Part I of this Article surveys these laws. Part II surveys bioethical
recommendations to limit or suppress the return of results and surveys the bioethical rationales that support those recommendations.
These include a litany of concerns about the dangers of communicating complex and uncertain genetic findings to scientifically naïve
research participants. Doing so, it is feared, may mislead participants
and potentially lead them to seek needless medical treatments or may
inflict psycho-social harms such as making them feel anxious or stig22
matized. Moreover, putting scientific information into the hands of
laypeople may bring about broader social and economic harms: for
example, wasteful healthcare spending as participants seek follow-up
care in a quest to make sense of their genomes; depletion of research
budgets by the allegedly high cost of returning results, and the possibility that laypeople may propagate non-canonical understandings of
the genome within the social networks they form during their search
23
to decipher what their genomes mean.
No doubt unintentionally, the debate about return of results has
taken on a striking resemblance to the 1520–1547 debate about trans24
lation of the English vernacular Bible. On one side of that debate
were proponents of a liberal reading culture that welcomed ordinary
laypeople to try their hand at interpreting canonical texts. “No longer blocked and oppressed by a mediating institution, the individual
Christian [was] finally able to read the Biblical text for him- or her-

19
20

21
22
23
24

See discussion infra Part II.
Lisa S. Parker, Returning Individual Research Results: What Role Should People’s Preferences
Play?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 449, 456 (2012) (“What appears rather consistent across
most of these studies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express a desire for receiving research results.”).
See discussion infra Part I (surveying various state and federal laws and regulations that
restrict communication of experimental test results).
See infra Part II, Table 1.
Id.
See SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 4 (dating this period from the importation of Lutheran theology to England in 1520 to the death of Henry VIII in 1547 and the succession of an unequivocally Protestant king).
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self.”25 A proponent of this view was William Tyndale who endured
exile, burning of his works and, ultimately, execution at the age of
26
forty-two for translating the Bible into English.
On the other side of this debate were learned men who saw it as
their duty to protect the public from the hazards of individual Bible27
reading. Some of their concerns rang of self-interest by entrenched
28
stakeholders who feared “innovations, commotions, and mutations”
if the public were allowed to bypass established church institutions
and intermediaries. But, part of their opposition reflected a sincere
belief that it is safer for people to remain illiterate and rely on wiser
minds to filter information for them. Some commentators argued
that Bible-reading may provoke fear or self-loathing by forcing people
to traverse (all alone) “a tightrope of terror across the abyss of dam29
nation,” presumably the sixteenth-century equivalent of discovering
that one has two copies of a high-penetrance, harmful allele for
which medical science offers no effective risk mitigation strategy.
30
Moreover, scripture is difficult to understand; common people are
31
too ignorant to understand it; and “misconstruction of the Scrip32
ture” can cause real harm: indeed, it can “slay the souls of men.”
John Stokesley, Bishop of London, felt it “abuseth the people in giving them liberty to read the scriptures, which doth nothing else but
33
infect them with heresies.” John Standish even complained that
“servants have been stubborn and recalcitrant ever since vernacular
34
Then, as now, thought-leaders
scripture was available to them.”
pressed for regulatory solutions. In 1542–1543, England enacted a
statute entitled An Acte for the Advancement of True Religion to address
disruptive translations that disseminate scripture to the public and

25
26
27
28

29
30

31

32
33
34

Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 34–37.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 58 (quoting GEORGE JOYE, A PRESENT CONSOLATION FOR THE SUFFERERS OF
PERSECUCION FOR RYGHTWYSENES image 3 (Antwerp 1544), available at
eebo.chadwyck.com).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 24 (summarizing the arguments of JOHN STANDISH, A DISCOURSE WHERIN IS
DEBATED WHETHER IT BE EXPEDIENT THAT THE SCRIPTURE SHOULD BE IN ENGLISH FOR AL
MEN TO READE THAT WYLL (London 1554), available at eebo.chadwyck.com).
Id. (citing STANDISH, supra note 30, at image 66); see also id. at 44 (citing Thomas More for
the proposition that ignorant people would not understand scholastic terms, such that
“[l]earned argument with them would be as effective as delivering an oration in French
to Turkish speakers.”).
Id. at 42 (citing John Fischer, Bishop of Rochester).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 25 (citing STANDISH, supra note 30, at image 73).
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“subvert the very true and perfect exposition . . . of the said Scripture,
35
after their perverse fantasies.”
With the possible exception of Standish’s beef with his unruly
servants, the arguments against the vernacular Bible are eerily similar
to modern bioethical arguments against the return of results from
genetic research (and Standish’s annoyance evokes the mutterings of
modern clinicians whose patients pepper them with questions about
medical articles that the patients gleaned from the Internet). The
thesis of this Article is that a sizable contingent of bioethicists and
policy-makers may have reasoned themselves onto the wrong side of
history on the matter of individual access to genetic test results.
When one arrives at consensus with Tyndale’s executioners, the question does arise.
This Article focuses strictly on the return of experimental genetic
test results although its findings also are relevant, with adaptations, to
direct-to-consumer genetic tests and prospective medicine. Parts III–
IV of this Article explore whether legal restrictions on the return of
results from genomic research may violate the First Amendment to
36
the U.S. Constitution. Past literature on the return of research results has focused heavily on investigators’ dutiesthat is, on identifying situations when an investigator has an ethical or legal obligation
to inform a research participant of results that could have medical or
37
other significance to the individual. This Article examines a different question: whether investigators have a right to communicate results to a research participant who has expressed the desire to receive
them. This discussion presumes that the research participant has requested return of results so that there is a consenting recipient.
Moreover, the investigator is potentially willing to share the information but is concerned that the requested communication may violate a law or regulation. This situation sets up the inquiry: Is the return of results to a willing research subject a form of speech that is

35
36

37

Id. at 54.
Strictly speaking, the First Amendment addresses federal restrictions on speech, but under the Fourteenth Amendment, state-law restrictions on speech also are subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.
See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law in the Debate over Return of Research Results and Incidental Findings: The Challenge of Developing Law for Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 435, 435–37 (2012) (noting concerns about potential liability for failure to return
results); Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of
Genomic Research, 14 GENETICS MED. 473, 475 (2012) (noting concerns despite the absence of statutory duties to return research results and a lack of lawsuits to date that
found a tort duty to return such results).
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entitled to protection under the First Amendment, such that laws that
block such speech may be unconstitutional?
The phrase “return of results” will refer to communication of individual results from a test performed in the context of research.
This Article conceives the return of results in its most general sense
without any presumption about whether the results have analytical
38
39
40
41
validity, clinical validity, or clinical utility /actionability. There
also is no presumption about whether the result pertains to a focal or
non-focal variable of the research studythat is, whether the result
pertains to a gene that researchers specifically were studying or is an
unrelated health finding that they happened to notice while examining the research participant or her test results. Unless expressly noted otherwise, return of results could involve any quality or type of results. At one end of the spectrum, this includes well-validated results
with high clinical or reproductive importance. At the other end, it
includes results with uncertain significance or dubious accuracy. The
discussion does, however, explore how the First Amendment analysis
may vary depending on what is being returned (well-validated, medically significant results vs. results of uncertain significance).
In contrast, much of the bioethical literature on this subject focuses on return of results that have clinical or reproductive signifi38

39

40

41

See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF
GENETIC TESTS:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 15 (2000), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/oversight_report.pdf [hereinafter SACGT,
2000 REPORT] (explaining that analytical validity is an indicator of how well a test
measures the property or characteristic it is intended to measure and addresses such matters as the test’s accuracy, rate of false positives and negatives, and reliability in the sense
of repeatedly getting the same result).
Id. at 15 n.11 (explaining that clinical validity refers to the accuracy with which a test predicts the presence or absence of a clinical condition or predisposition; it addresses
whether there is a strong and well validated association between having a particular gene
variant and having a particular health condition and whether knowing that a person has
the gene variant offers meaningful insight into the person’s health or reproductive risks);
see Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575 (2010) (expressing
this concept by stating that a test result has an “established” meaning).
SACGT, 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 15 n.12 (“Clinical utility refers to the usefulness
of the test and the value of the information to the person being tested. If a test has utility, it means that the resultspositive or negativeprovide information that is of value to
the person being tested because he or she can use that information to seek an effective
treatment or preventive strategy. Even if no interventions are available to treat or prevent
the disease or condition, there may be benefits associated with knowledge of the result.”).
Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 575 (“Actionable means that disclosure has the potential to
lead to an improved health outcome; there must be established therapeutic or preventive
interventions available or other available actions that may change the course of the disease.”).
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cance. For example, studies led by Professor Susan Wolf have de42
fined incidental findings (“IFs”) and individual research results
43
(“IRRs”). Both IFs and IRRs are findings about an individual research participant that have “potential health or reproductive im44
portance.” The distinction between IFs and IRRs turns on whether
the finding pertains to a focal or non-focal variable in the studythat
45
is, whether the finding arose within or outside the aims of the study.
Wolf’s research recognizes that this focal/non-focal distinction may
have limited utility in the context of whole-exome, whole-genome, or
genome-wide association studies where much or all of the genome is
being studied, but it cites practical reasons for distinguishing IFs and
46
IRRs. In this Article, return of results includes the return of IFs and
IRRs, but also could include communicating additional findings that
lack health or reproductive importance. Returning results is simply
the act of letting research participants “know what has been learned
47
about them” even if a truthful disclosure would need to point out
that the results are of uncertain quality and/or significance.
Spurred by the advent of the printing press, the vernacular Bible
48
was “unstoppably popular” despite thought-leaders’ concerns that it
would slay its readers’ souls. Some of the newly empowered sixteenth-century readers left written accounts of the intensity and

42

43

44
45
46

47

48

See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis
and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219 (2008) (“An IF [incidental finding]
is a finding concerning an individual research participant that has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course of conducting research but is beyond the aims of the study.”).
See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 364 (2012) (“[A]n
IRR [individual research result] is a finding concerning an individual contributor that
has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course of research, when the finding is on the focal variables under study in meeting the stated aims
of the research project.”).
See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 219; Wolf et al., supra note 43 at 364.
Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 219; Wolf et al., supra note 43 at 364.
See Wolf et al., supra note 43, at 364 (noting that some institutions’ policies recognize this
difference); see also Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 (noting that investigators are more
likely to have expertise for interpreting individual research results that are within the
scope of a study but may lack expertise to interpret incidental findings that are outside
the scope of their research).
See 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 72 (1999) [hereinafter 1 NBAC, 1999
REPORT] (explaining that some writers, including R.M. Veatch, favor the return of interim results on the basis that research participants have a right to know what has been
learned about them) (citation omitted).
SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 56.
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sweetness of reading the scriptures for themselves.49 As advances in
genome sequencing technology bring us closer to the $1000 genome
that ordinary people will be able to afford, many are burning to read
this latest Book of Life wherein, to borrow words from Tyndale’s Pref50
ace, “every syllable pertaineth to thine own self.” Return of results is
the act of opening the Book of Life and letting research participants
peek into its pages. Does the First Amendment protect the modern
Tyndales who engage in these forbidden conversations?
I. RESTRICTIONS ON THE RETURN OF RESEARCH RESULTS
Several interrelated sources of law potentially restrict communication of genetic test results to research participants. These are summarized below and contrasted with other restrictions that exist but
are non-legal in nature.
A. State Statutes and Regulations
Some ethicists advise that “[w]henever IFs are to be disclosed,
51
they should be disclosed directly to the research participant.” Even
when this approach has ethical advantages, it may raise legal issues in
a number of U.S. states, because some states restrict the ability of laboratories to report test results directly to test subjects. A recent survey of fifty-five U.S. states and territories found thirteen jurisdictions
52
that only allow test results to be reported to a healthcare provider.
Seven more states allow results to be disclosed directly to the test sub53
These twenty states treat
ject only with the provider’s approval.
healthcare providers as intermediaries or gatekeepers in any communication between laboratories and test subjects. Only nine jurisdictions (including seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico) provide a mechanism for reporting test results directly to the
54
test subject.

49
50
51
52

53
54

Id. at 57.
Id. at 57 (citing TYNDALE’S OLD TESTAMENT 8 (William Tyndale trans., David Daniell ed.,
1992)).
Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 240.
CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Results, 76 Fed. Reg.
56712, 56717 (proposed Sept. 14, 2011) (to be codified 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt.
164) (citing P. JON WHITE & JODI DANIEL, RTI INT’L, PRIVACY AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS
FOR INTEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: RELEASING CLINICAL LABORATORY
TEST RESULTS: REPORT ON SURVEY OF STATE LAWS (2009)).
Id.
Id.
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The law is silent in the remaining twenty-six states and territories:
direct reporting of results to test subjects is not forbidden but neither
55
does the law allow it. When law is silent, other sources of norms
such as professional standards, customs, or investigators’ own beliefs
may determine test subjects’ access to their results. Informal norms
of this sort ordinarily do not count as legal restrictions on the return
of results unless they are enforceable by law, for example, if a state’s
medical licensure laws allow disciplinary action for violation of a pro56
fessional ethics norm. Ethical standards that restrict speech can
raise constitutional questions, just as a law would do, if compliance
with the standards is obligatory under a law or regulation. Professional standards of ethics have been challenged on First Amendment
grounds in situations where states used disbarment or disciplinary
proceedings to enforce attorneys’ compliance with standards of legal
57
ethics.
B. State Common Law
To date, investigators have not actually faced tort lawsuits in rela58
tion to return of genetic test results. Medical malpractice cases can
59
arise only in the context of medical practice activities. Return of results, even though it may address topics that also arise during medical
60
practice encounters, is distinct from the practice of medicine. “Because the express or implied consent of the physician is required” in
55
56

57

58

59

60

Id.
See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947–48 (discussing the ability of states to regulate
“professional speech,” or communications professionals make in the course of their professional practices, through various mechanisms such as disciplinary license proceedings
and medical malpractice actions aimed at maintaining reasonable standards of competency and compliance with professional standards).
See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 193–96 (1982) (challenging standards of legal ethics
that sought to protect clients from misleading speech by restricting the words attorneys
could use to describe their qualifications and practice areas); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (challenging ethical rules restricting advertising by attorneys).
See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 37, at 475 (noting that no lawsuits have found investigators liable for failure to return results); see also Wolf, supra note 37, at 436–37 (noting
the apparent absence of suits for mishandling this issue in either direction—either failing
to return findings or for wrongly doing so).
See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 844 (1999) (“[A] plaintiff in a malpractice case
must demonstrate that the challenged advice not only was issued by a physician, but that
it was conveyed in the context of a physician-patient relationship.”).
See Barbara J. Evans, Minimizing Liability Risks Under the ACMG Recommendations for Reporting Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 915
(2013); see also discussion infra Part IV.E.
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order for a physician-patient relationship to come into being, “the
physician must take some affirmative action with regard to treatment
61
of a patient in order for the relationship to be established.” Even
assuming the research investigator happens to be a physician, the return of results does not involve the critical treatment step. “A physician-patient relationship is not established by the mere act of a physician agreeing to see a patient at a later time or suggesting that the
62
A medical malpractice suit
patient contact another physician.”
based on return of results seemingly must founder because return of
63
results is not the practice of medicine.
This fact has not stopped investigators and commentators from
feeling concern about potential legal liability either “for failure to return findings on one side, [or] . . . for wrongly returning on the oth64
er.” Unlike state statutes and regulations that can actually ban behaviors, tort lawsuits allow the behavior to occur, but may impose
sanctions (such as requiring the payment of damages) for engaging
65
in the behavior. Clearly, though, the threat of having to pay damages can discourage behavior just as effectively as an outright ban would
do. Assiduous worriers are able to envision scenarios in which an investigator might be sued for returning results: for example, for negligently returning results that later prove wrong, for returning results
without obtaining a properly informed consent to do so, or for inflicting emotional or physical harms by returning results. Such suits (and
the perceived threat of such suits) chill the return of results and thus
constitute a legal restriction on the return of results. Again, this liability remains largely theoretical at present as no cases appear to have
been brought as of this date.
C. Federal Restrictions on Communication of Results from CLIA-Certified
Laboratories
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988
(“CLIA”) place various restrictions on the communication of results

61
62
63

64
65

Amy G. Gore et al., Relation of Physician and Patient: Consensual Relationship and Contractual
Agreements, 61 AM. JUR. 2D PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, ETC. § 130 (updated Feb. 2013).
Id. (citing Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d. 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) and Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001), as corrected May 9, 2001).
See, e.g., Ande v. Rock, 647 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (deciding, in a suit involving
non-return of a diagnosis of cystic fibrosis in a research setting, that research is not the
practice of medicine); see also discussion infra Part IV.E.
Wolf, supra note 37, at 437.
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (discussing the difference between statutory proscriptions and tort sanctions).

560

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

to test subjects. Even when testing is performed at a CLIA-certified
lab, returning results directly to test subjects may be unlawful for reasons explained below. The current CLIA regulation at 42 C.F.R.
§ 493.1291(f) limits disclosure of test results from CLIA-compliant
labs to three categories of persons. First, CLIA allows disclosure of
66
test results to “authorized persons,” which CLIA defines as including
67
those authorized by state law to order or receive test results. In
states that restrict the reporting of results to individual test subjects,
CLIA incorporates those same restrictions. In 2011, the Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) proposed to amend the
CLIA regulation to allow test subjects to have greater access to their
68
own test results, but the final rule has not yet been issued. Until an
amended regulation goes into effect, test subjects can receive direct
access to results from CLIA-compliant labs only in states that allow direct reporting. When state law is silent, HHS interprets CLIA as treat69
ing individual test subjects as authorized persons. Thus, HHS views
CLIA as allowing disclosure of results to test subjects in the nine states
and territories that expressly allow it and in the twenty-six jurisdic70
tions where law is silent. The remaining two categories of persons
who can receive CLIA-certified test results are as follows: CLIAcertified labs may report results to the person responsible for using
the test results in the treatment contextthat is, to a healthcare pro71
vider. Also, in the case of reference labs, CLIA allows reporting of
72
results to the referring lab.
An important caveat is that the CLIA amendments proposed in
2011 would not apply to all laboratories, but only to CLIA-compliant
labs that also are subject to the major federal privacy regulation
73
known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Section 164.524 of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule grants patients a right to inspect and obtain copies of
the patients’ own protected health information that doctors, hospi66
67
68
69

70
71
72
73

42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f).
42 C.F.R. § 493.2.
CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 52.
See id. at 56717 (stating that HHS believes its proposed rule allowing test subjects direct
access to their test results would have no impact in states where law is silent, thus implying
that HHS interprets the silence of state law as permitting direct disclosure already).
Id.
42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f).
Id.
CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 52, at 56715 (“As a result of this proposal, HIPAA covered entities that are laboratories subject to CLIA would have the same
obligations as other types of covered healthcare providers with respect to providing individuals with access to their protected health information . . . .”); see also HIPAA Privacy
Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164.
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tals, and other HIPAA-covered healthcare providers hold in “desig74
nated record sets” (“DRS”). A DRS includes medical and billing
records and other information “[u]sed in whole or in part, by or for
75
CLIAthe covered entity to make decisions about individuals.”
compliant laboratories traditionally have enjoyed an exception and
76
were not subject to this § 164.524 disclosure requirement. Thus, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule gave patients access to the test results that labs
had reported to physicians or hospitals, but not to other information
generated during the testing process and stored in the lab’s own files.
This difference is crucially important in an era of whole genome and
exome sequencing, which test many thousands of genetic variants
within a person’s genome, many of which may be irrelevant to the
disease that caused the physician to order the testing and which
77
therefore may never be reported back to the physician. To have access to all the personal genetic information generated during testing,
test subjects need a right of access to information held by labs. The
CLIA amendments proposed in 2011 seemingly would give test subjects that right with respect to genetic information held by CLIA78
compliant labs that are subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Even after these amendments, however, there will be ongoing problems with

74

75
76
77

78

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (describing the individual’s general right to inspect and
obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set).
45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining the term “designated record set”).
45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1)(iii).
See generally James P. Evans, Return of Results: Not That Complicated?, 14 GENETICS MED.
358, 358–59 (2012) (describing whole genome sequencing and explaining that it may
generate large amounts of extra genetic information that has questionable relevance to
human health, which some test subjects may nevertheless want to know).
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (clarifying, in recent revisions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, that genetic information is health information for purposes of HIPAA); see also U.S. Dep’t. of
Health & Human Servs., Off. of the Ass’t Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (Final Rule), 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,
82,605–06 (Dec. 28, 2000) (providing guidance on the meaning of the term “designated
record set” and noting that a DRS includes information that “may be used” (not merely is
used) “in whole or in part” to make decisions about individuals; that it includes all data
that “are normally used, and are reasonably likely to be used, to make decisions” and not
just information that “already has been used”; that it “includes records that are used to
make decisions about any individuals, whether or not the records have been used to make
a decision about the particular individual requesting access”; and that the DRS is not limited to data “used to make healthcare decisions, because other decisions by covered entities can also affect individuals’ interests.”). This guidance strongly suggests the 2011 proposed rule change would grant test subjects access not just to completed test reports but
to most or all of the genetic information that a CLIA-compliant, HIPAA-covered laboratory has on file about them.
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individual access to data held by non-CLIA labs and labs that are not
subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
D. Federal Restrictions on Communication of Results from Non-CLIACertified Research Laboratories
The regulation at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) is commonly known as
the CLIA research exception. It allows research laboratories to operate without CLIA certification provided they adhere to certain limits
on their activities. CLIA’s certification requirements are triggered if
research laboratories “report patient specific results for the diagnosis,
prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the as79
sessment of the health of individual patients.” There has been ongoing debate about how to interpret this provision. Seemingly authoritative sources assert that the CLIA regulations “prohibit the
80
return of results to patients unless the laboratory is CLIA certified.”
CLIA training materials assert that CLIA “[i]ncludes research when
81
These
results are returned [and] specimens have unique ID.”
statements interpret § 493.3(b)(2) as requiring CLIA certification if
patient-specific results are returned for any purpose. Quite clearly,
that is not what the regulation says.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act
82
is framed.” The same is true of regulations: the best guide to their
meaning is to read them. Section 493.3(b)(2) requires CLIA certification only if a laboratory reports results for specific, enumerated
purposes: diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and assessment of health. According to the plain text of the regulation, returning results for other purposes does not trigger CLIA’s certification requirements. By analogy, a regulation that requires people to
hold a driver’s license if they use a car for driving does not require a
license if they use a car for other purposes (such as riding, investing,
or living in the car). In construing legal texts, courts “lean in favor of

79
80

81

82

42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF
GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES 128 (2008) [hereinafter “SACGHS, 2008 REPORT”].
Judy Yost, Div. of Lab. Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Quick CLIA 101 &
CLIA Compliance
sl. 3 (2003) (unpublished visual presentation), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/meetings/October2003/Yost.pdf.
See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 225 (2002); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the plain meaning rule).
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a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
83
one which may make some of them idle and nugatory.” This “surplusage canon” of legal construction requires that “[i]f possible, every
word and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be
84
ignored” or treated as having no consequence. Administrative law
judges follow this canon when interpreting the CLIA statute and reg85
ulations. It violates the surplusage canon to assert that any return of
patient-specific results triggers a need for CLIA certification. Doing
so ignores an important qualifying clause: CLIA certification is required only if labs “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the
86
health of individual patients.”
Unfortunately, the CLIA regulations do not define what it means
for a report to be for the enumerated purposes (as opposed to being
for some other purpose). CLIA stratifies legal compliance obligations based on the purpose of lab test results, yet it supplies no guidance on how this purpose should be assessed. This is a serious defect
of the CLIA regulations. For comparison, consider the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) medical device regulations. They
also stratify regulatory compliance obligations based on a test’s purpose. If an in vitro diagnostic product is “intended for use in the di87
agnosis of disease,” the manufacturer must comply with certain FDA
88
labeling requirements. Devices “intended for processing, repacking,
or use in the manufacture of another drug or device” are exempt
89
from these requirements. As in CLIA’s research exemption, having
a diagnostic purpose gives rise to regulatory compliance obligations.
Unlike CLIA, however, the FDA device regulations define how to
90
assess a device’s purpose. Such an assessment requires decisions
83

THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
58 (1868).
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
174–79 (2012) (discussing the surplusage canon).
See, e.g., In re Blanding Urgent Care Ctr. Lab. v. Health Care Fin. Admin., No. CR438,
1996 WL 600630, at *1, *14 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Sept. 30, 1996) (“A cardinal rule of statutory construction is to interpret the statute in such a way that no part is
rendered meaningless.”).
42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (emphasis added).
21 C.F.R. § 801.119.
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (requiring adequate directions for use); see also 21 C.F.R. § 809.10 (describing labeling requirements for in vitro
diagnostic products).
21 C.F.R. § 801.122.
21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (“The words intended uses or words of similar import in §§ 801.5,
801.119, and 801.122 refer to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of devices. The intent is determined by such person’s expressions or may be
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION

84
85

86
87
88

89
90
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about a number of matters. Obviously, a key question is whether diagnostic purpose will be gauged by the intent of the device manufacturer or by how the device actually is used by practitioners and patients. If intent is determinative, then what sources of evidence will
the FDA use to infer the manufacturer’s subjective intent? For example, will the agency consider only product labeling, advertisements, and official statements by the manufacturer, or will it also consider statements by sales representatives and informal statements
(such as a manufacturer’s internal e-mails)? What happens if a manufacturer does not intend a device to be used for a diagnostic purpose yet is aware it is being so used? Does delivering a device with
awareness that it will be put to an unintended use constitute intent
for the device to have that use, or not? If persons other than the
manufacturer alter a device’s intended use, are they (rather than the
manufacturer) responsible for complying with the FDA regulations?
All of these questions are addressed in the FDA’s definition of “in91
tended use” and in court cases that have interpreted the meaning of
92
that phrase.
In contrast, the CLIA regulation fails to explain how the regulator
will assess the purpose of a test report. Consequently, the CLIA regulation is vague in the sense that a person of ordinary intelligence
would not necessarily know what the regulation prohibits. Indeed,

91
92

shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article. This objective intent may, for example, be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written
statements by such persons or their representatives. It may be shown by the circumstances that the article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered
and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised. The intended uses
of an article may change after it has been introduced into interstate commerce by its
manufacturer. If, for example, a packer, distributor, or seller intends an article for different uses than those intended by the person from whom he received the device, such
packer, distributor, or seller is required to supply adequate labeling in accordance with
the new intended uses. But if a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of facts that
would give him notice that a device introduced into interstate commerce by him is to be
used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers it, he is required to provide adequate labeling for such a device which accords with such other uses
to which the article is to be put.”).
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. An Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d. 1026, 1028–
29 (10th Cir. 1994) (determining that specimen collection containers used in testing for
the presence of HIV were “intended for use in diagnosis of disease” as this phrase is understood in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, even though the specimen containers had
been used as part of a protocol that produced inconclusive diagnostic results); United
States v. 25 Cases, More or Less, of an Article of Device, 942 F.2d 1179, 1181–83 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that the term “diagnosis” in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) encompasses articles
that screen for possible symptoms of disease even if the screening does not provide final
identification of the condition).
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people with considerable expertise may find this regulation unclear.
Exemplifying this uncertainty, Wolf et al. warn that 42 C.F.R. §
493.3(b)(2) “may mean that under current regulations, research labs
may not report ‘research results’ when these are individual-specific
93
and may be used to assess health or trigger such assessment.” While
it seems unlikely that a court would hold that urging a person to seek
a health assessment is itself a health assessment, the sheer vagueness
of CLIA’s research exception does invite such speculation. To date,
no court cases have clarified the meaning of the phrase “for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or
94
the assessment of the health of individual patients” in § 493.3(b)(2).
CLIA certification clearly seems to be required when investigators
plan to use test results in a way that affects the course of care for
study participants (for example, to assign participants to the treat95
ment arm of a study). If test results are not so used, clinicians and
investigators confront a legal gray area: Does merely communicating
test results to study participants amount to the type of reporting that,
under § 493.3(b)(2), triggers a need for CLIA compliance? This legal uncertainty is chilling communication of results from non-CLIAcertified labs.
A National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
(“NHLBI”) Working Group noted that there is significant disagreement about “what constitutes compliance with the CLIA regulations
for the return of research results in genetics studies” and that “[t]his
96
is a high-impact issue.”
E. Federal Restrictions on Communication Under the Common Rule
As a condition of receiving research funding from the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), investigators are required to comply
97
with the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, or
98
“Common Rule.” The Common Rule requires approval and ongoing
oversight of research by an Institutional Review Board (“IRB”). Although IRBs are private ethical review bodies often staffed by employ-

93
94
95
96
97

98

Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 246 n.81.
Based on a search of Westlaw’s state and federal judicial database for cases citing 42
C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
Kathy Todd, Div. of Lab. Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CLIA and Clinical
Trials sl. 9 (unpublished visual presentation).
Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 576.
See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (“Common Rule”), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2011).
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.124.
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ees of the institution that is conducting the research,99 their involvement in research oversight is required by federal regulations. If an
IRB restricts the return of research results to participants in an NIHfunded study, this restriction can be characterized as a condition on
the receipt of a federal grant. Such restrictions, therefore, count as
legally imposed restrictions on the communication of results from
federally funded research.
It may raise constitutional issues for the NIH to place speechrestricting conditions on its grants, and this is true even though the
NIH is free to withhold grants altogether. An example helps clarify
the potential problem. If it is unconstitutional for the federal government to refuse to let women vote, it is equally unconstitutional for
the government to award monetary grants to women on condition
that recipients must voluntarily agree not to vote. The “government
100
may not do indirectly what it may not do directly.” The notoriously
101
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions102 addresses
enigmatic
whether particular restrictions on federal spending violate the Constitution. If it would violate the Constitution for the federal government to muzzle investigators directly, then it potentially may violate
the Constitution for NIH to condition its grants on oversight by private IRBs that do the day-to-day work of restricting investigators’
103
speech.
104
Here, it is timely to distinguish Rust v. Sullivan, which upheld a
rule that prevented federally funded family planning clinics from of105
Rust
fering advice on “abortion as a method of family planning.”
arose in a medical practice setting, not a research setting, and it is
recognized that “speech in the physician-patient relationship may be
106
regulated in a manner that speech outside that context cannot.”
Moreover, the Court in Rust did not answer whether “traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation,
99
100
101
102

103

104
105
106

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.103(b), 46.107–46.108 (describing IRBs).
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
See id. at 1415–16 (characterizing Supreme Court cases addressing unconstitutional conditions as “a minefield to be traversed gingerly”).
See id. at 1415 (“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right,
even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”).
It was beyond the scope of this Phase I study to conduct a full analysis of IRB-imposed
speech restrictions under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions; that inquiry is
scheduled for a later phase of this ongoing research project.
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 180.
Halberstam, supra note 59, at 846.
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even when subsidized by the Government.”107 Instead, the decision
turned on the fact that the physician was rendering services in a program that offered a narrow, federally defined scope of healthcare services, such that patients would not expect to receive comprehensive
108
medical advice. Rust did not hold that federal subsidies nullify the
First Amendment rights of physicians, and it certainly did not make
any statement about how federal subsidies affect the First Amendment rights of researchers. The 2013 decision in Agency for Interna109
tional Development v. Alliance for Open Society, a case that involved
compelled speech rather than speech restrictions, further demonstrates that entities who receive federal funding still have First
110
Amendment rights.
Because IRBs have significant discretion to make decisions about
the return of results, there are no explicit substantive rules that mandate how return of results must be handled under the Common Rule.
Individual IRBs do, however, refer to a variety of sources for suggestions about ethically appropriate approaches to the return of results.
These sources include scholarly bioethical studies and recommendations prepared by governmental advisory bodies and independent
working groups. Because these recommendations influence institutional policies and IRB decisions about return of results, Part II reviews several such sources and identifies recurring themes. This Article treats these bioethical recommendations as an indicator of the
speech restrictions investigators may face as a result of regulation under the Common Rule.
F. Non-Legal Forms of Restriction
In addition to the legal restrictions just described, investigators
encounter additional constraints on the communication of research
results to study participants. These include restrictions imposed by
private parties whether as a result of custom, institutional policy, or
misunderstanding of the law. For example, some investigators have
encountered difficulty publishing their works in academic journals
after scientific peer reviewers asserted that the investigators had broken the law by returning results from non-CLIA-certified laboratories

107
108
109
110

500 U.S. at 200.
Id.
133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
Id. at 2330 (“This case is not about the Government’s ability to enlist the assistance of
those with whom it already agrees. It is about compelling a grant recipient to adopt a
particular belief as a condition of funding.”).
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to research participants. Scientific peer reviewers, presumably lacking any training in law or legal process, wield the power to suppress
publication of studies by alleging that return of results is illegal. For
purposes of First Amendment analysis, these privately imposed sanctions must be distinguished from the legally imposed sanctions described earlier. The U.S. Constitution protects against wrongs imposed by government, but offers no remedy for privately imposed
wrongs. There is no constitutional remedy if private parties, such as
peer reviewers or academic journal editors, impose hardships on investigators who choose to return results to study participants.
The Constitution does, however, limit the power of state and federal governments to restrict communication, whether through state
laws that forbid disclosure of test results to research participants or
through federal laws such as the CLIA regulations and the Common
Rule. The remainder of this Article explores whether the resulting
restrictions on investigators’ communication with research participants may violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
II. THE BIOETHICAL VIEW OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
The field of bioethics has never fully engaged with the question of
whether it is ethical to regulate or ban communication. The foundational principles of bioethics, such as those set out in the Belmont
111
Report, unquestionably are broad enough to sustain an inquiry into
whether it is appropriate to suppress communication among consenting adults. The absence of a well-developed, systematic bioethical inquiry appears to be the product of neglect or lack of interest, rather
than a logical consequence of the ethical principles bioethicists embrace.
The principles of respect for autonomy and respect for persons
clearly would support such an inquiry. Speech restrictions may conflict with these principles: restrictions on consensual communications implicate autonomy interests of both the speaker and the lis112
tener, and it potentially displays contempt for persons (rather than
111

112

See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, BELMONT REPORT:
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter, “BELMONT REPORT”] (setting out broad ethical principles to guide the protection of human research subjects, including beneficence, nonmaleficence, respect for persons and respect for their autonomy, and justice).
See 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72 (citing Veatch for the idea that the principle of autonomy dictates that subjects have a right to know what has been learned about
them) (internal citation omitted); Mark A. Rothstein, Tiered Disclosure Options Promote the
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respect for persons) to presume that they are too credulous or illinformed to make appropriate use of communications provided to
them. Decisions to regulate or ban speech are thus rich in potential
bioethical issues. Nevertheless, the bioethics literature, with some
frequency, recommends speech restrictions as a way to protect human research subjects. For example, the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (“NBAC”) has stated,
Experts disagree about whether findings from research should be communicated to subjects, although most do believe that findings should not
be conveyed unless they are confirmed and reliable and constitute clinically significant or scientifically relevant information. Those who oppose
revealing unconfirmed findings argue that the harms that could result
from revealing preliminary data are serious, including anxiety or unnecessary (and possibly harmful) medical interventions. They prefer to
avoid such harms by controlling the flow of information to subjects and
by limiting communications to those that constitute reliable infor113
mation.

Note how casually this passage states that “findings should not be
conveyed” and discusses “controlling the flow of information to subjects.” Contrast NBAC’s statement with that of the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has described freedom of speech as so important that its
“suppression or abridgement . . . cannot be regarded otherwise than
114
with grave concern” and also has noted that the “loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unques115
As discussed below, many
tionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
bioethicists treat two major classes of speech restrictions as unobjectionable and even desirable in connection with the return of results:
(1) restrictions on the content of what investigators and participants

113
114

115

Autonomy and Well-Being of Research Subjects, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 20, 20 (2006) (discussing
respect for autonomy as entailing consideration of participants’ formulations of benefit,
harm, and acceptable risk); Isaac S. Kohane & Patrick L. Taylor, Multidimensional Results
Reporting to Participants in Genomic Studies: Getting It Right, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1
(2010) (considering the impact of return of results on participants’ personhood and autonomy); Sharon F. Terry, The Tension Between Policy and Practice in Returning Research Results and Incidental Findings in Genomic Biobank Research, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 691,
698 (2012) (noting that some nations’ policies give stronger recognition to the rights of
research participants to be informed of their genetic data than do U.S. policies).
1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 382
(1973) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co.,
486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988) (noting that suppressed opportunities for speech are irretrievably lost).
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may discuss, and (2) prior censorship116 of investigators’ speechthat
is, oversight and approval of speech before the speech takes place.
A. Content-Based Restrictions on the Return of Results
The bioethics community appears generally comfortable with the
notion of limiting speech about certain types of research results.
There are particular concerns about returning uncertain results, even
with appropriate disclaimers. Bookman et al. counsel “extreme cau117
tion” in returning results that are preliminary and not validated by
other studies. Parker has noted that “[i]t is generally, though not
uniformly, agreed that unreliable results ought not be offered back to
118
Reliability often is framed in terms of the analytical
individuals.”
validity of the test and factors that bear on the quality of the laboratory that performed the test, such as the competence of lab personnel
and whether controls are in place to avoid mixing up biospecimens
collected from different test subjects. CLIA-certified laboratories implement quality standards aimed at avoiding errors and mix-ups, but
non-CLIA certified research labs may or may not follow equivalent
119
When bioethicists recommend suppressing the return
standards.
120
results from non-CLIA-certified labs, this may be for legal reasons
(because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that CLIA requires this) or
for ethical reasons (because they believe CLIA certification helps protect human research participants by improving the reliability of test
116

117
118
119

120

Many bioethicists have objected to the use of “censorship” to describe the role ethics review bodies play in overseeing the return of results. The ordinary dictionary meaning of
this term merely involves prior review of a proposed communication with the aim of suppressing
unacceptable
parts
of
it.
See,
e.g.,
Oxford
Dictionaries,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/censor (defining the
verb “censor” as meaning to “examine (a book, movie, etc.) officially and suppress unacceptable parts of it”). By this definition, the term “censorship” fairly describes the role of
ethics review bodies in determining which results are unacceptable for return. There is
no intent to suggest Orwellian ideological control or political repression.
Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies: Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140 AM. J. MED. GENETICS pt. A, 1033, 1037 (2006).
Parker, supra note 20, at 452.
See Scott D. Jewell, Perspective on Biorepository Return of Results and Incidental Findings, 13
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 655, 665 (2012) (discussing the advantages of CLIA’s requirements for proficiency, certification, and quality control in biospecimen repositories that
plan to return results).
See id. at 663 (“CLIA is clearly a requirement and the process on the engagement of CLIAlicensed assay reporting is well known . . . .”); Karen J. Maschke, Returning Genetic Research
Results: Considerations for Existing No-Return and Future Biobanks, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
559, 566–67 (2012) (“Commentators disagree about how to interpret CLIA requirements
in the research context. . . . [But] [s]ome institutions may require genetic research results
to be CLIA-validated before they are offered to biospecimen donors.”).
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results). Among commentators there is “a near-universal demand for
121
analytic validity as a precondition” for return of results.
Many commentators additionally call for results to be returned
only if they have clinical validitythat is, a well-established clinical or
122
reproductive significance. Even when test results satisfy basic criteria of analytical and clinical validity, many bioethicists feel results
should not be returned unless they also have clinical utility or action123
ability. If there are no treatments or other measures a person can
take to address the risks associated with having a gene mutation, then
returning test results would merely imbue the participant with idle
knowledge to which there is no practical response.
Restrictions on the return of results may serve important bioethical values, but there are competing values at stake, including values
that the First Amendment protects. A free-speech advocate might
voice the following concerns: controlling access to information can
manipulate people’s viewpoints. Apart from forcing participants to
124
walk “a tightrope of terror across the abyss of damnation,” informing people that they have problems for which medical science has no
solutions could cause them to view healthcare providers as powerless
and thus may lower healthcare institutions in the public’s esteem.
This latter point has not been raised in the bioethics literature, but
there are obvious stakeholder advantages in censoring speech about
swathes of the genome that reduce our learned intermediaries to
tongue-tied stammering, while permitting free discussion of actionable findingsthat is, those that showcase healthcare providers’ ability
to perform miracles. Censoring the return of non-actionable results
fosters a point of view that members of the scientific and medical
communities are competent and that their expertise can improve
people’s lives. From a free-speech standpoint, it is disturbing to

121

122

123

124

Wolf, supra note 37, at 446; see also Ingrid A. Holm & Patrick L. Taylor, The Informed Cohort
Oversight Board: From Values to Architecture, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 676 (2012)
(supporting disclosure of information even if its clinical significance is uncertain but requiring that it be analytically valid).
See, e.g., 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71; Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 235; see
also Maschke, supra note 120, at 559 (citing the fact that most genetic research results
have uncertain clinical significance as a reason why many biobanks adopt a “no-return”
policy). But see id. at 559–60 (noting that some commentators contend that persons who
contribute biospecimens for research should have access to genetic test results even if the
information is of uncertain clinical significance).
See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 (“Disclosure should occur only when findings are valid and confirmed, have significant health implications, and the health problem can be
treated.”).
SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 29.
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channel research participants’ thoughts toward this (or any other)
viewpoint.
Suppressing speech about genes that lack clinical validity and utility also helps keep the genome medical by permitting the public to
learn about their genes only in situations where their genes are medical. This fosters a control relationship in which medical institutions
remain keepers of the Book of Life, to be discussed only in terms that
they define. In the way of all sacred texts, the human genome is susceptible to many meanings, just as the Christian scriptures are variously viewed as a religious text, a work of soaring literary beauty, an
anthropological or historical record, and a tract advancing a deeply
subversive social program to resist Roman imperialism and empower
the meek, unpropertied masses. In the same way, the human genome offers many meanings, not all of them medical.
Banning the return of non-clinically-significant results is a form of
censorship that advances a favored point of view that the human genome has one true meaning, which is medical. A public indoctrinated with this point of view may channel its natural curiosity about the
human genome into political support for a large federal research
budget to fund medical exegesis of the genome. This public may tolerate the cost in time and money of having medical intermediaries
order their tests for them and may press their insurers to cover
healthcare visits in which people consult with the medical keepers of
the human genome (which has one true meaning, which is medical).
Suppressing the return of results that lack clinical validity and utility
advances a point of view that favors continuance of entrenched
healthcare institutional arrangements. The bioethics literature has
not explored this possibility, although it would be of obvious concern
to a free-speech advocate.
An emerging strand of bioethics does explore the possibility that
information may have personal utility or meaning even when it is not
actionable in the sense of contributing to improved health out125
Still, not all bioethicists agree that personal meaning supcomes.
126
“[T]he literature on
plies a legitimate basis for returning results.

125

126

See Terry, supra note 112, at 710–11 (discussing the emerging concept of “personal utility”); see also Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 n.80 (citing various sources for the proposition that results should be returned only if they have clinical utility, but noting that there
is debate about what constitutes “clinical utility” with some definitions focusing narrowly
on health outcomes while others admit a broader concept that a result has utility if it is
important to the individuals and families involved).
Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 578 (noting that some members of the NHLBI working
group dissented from its recommendation that investigators “may choose” to disclose “re-
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whether to return individual research results commonly discourages
returning results that lack clinical validity and clinical utility; much of
the debate focuses on results whose uncertain meaning and im127
portance is the reason for the research.” It is difficult to find bioethicists who advocate return of all results including those that have
128
uncertain accuracy or significance, even if appropriate disclaimers
are made and even if the research participant desires the information.
Free-speech advocates also might be concerned that restrictions
on the return of results inhibit political advocacy by gene-based
communities. Sharon Terry notes that granting people access to
129
their genetic test information stimulates curiosity and participation
and it fosters social networks among people who share particular
130
genes. People who have a gene variant may enjoy associating with
other people who carry that same variant even if its medical significance is presently unknown. “[R]esults that are common to the
community could challenge the community’s sense of who it is. This
could be true in an ethnic or geographic community as well as dis131
ease-based community.”
Networks of people who share particular gene variants are a forum for elaborating non-medical meanings of the human genome
(for example, if members of a gene-based community discover that
they fancy the poetry of Ezra Pound more than other people do).
This search for non-medical meaning probably qualifies as harmless
fun. Where bioethicists grow concerned is when gene-based communities of laypeople presume to speculate about the genome’s medical significance. Terry mentions cases where communities of laypeople have asserted scientifically dubious associations between genes
and cystic fibrosis severity or have advocated novel, unsubstantiated
treatments or concluded that gene variants cause symptoms that, to
132
date, have no known association with the genes the people have.
Bioethicists and scientists express concern about letting laypeople
learn from each other and elaborate community beliefs about the
133
genome, especially if the beliefs are medical in nature.

127
128
129
130
131
132
133

sults related to reproductive risks, personal meaning or utility, or health risks” subject to
various conditions).
See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 (footnote omitted).
Wolf, supra note 37, at 445.
Terry, supra note 112, at 700.
Id. at 714 (exploring how test results impact community identity and norms).
Id.
Id. at 714–15.
Id. at 715–16.
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Gene-based communities do not always take medicine into their
own hands. Instead, they sometimes become forceful advocates for
mainstream research, but even this role can be controversial. Their
advocacy efforts may include petitioning the government to make
134
public funds available to study their gene of interest or developing
private resources for research via fundraising, biobanking, and other
efforts within the affected community. One community-driven effort
of this latter sort began in the late 1980s, when carriers of mutations
in the gene associated with Canavan disease worked together to collect biospecimens and funds and enlisted investigators to study the
135
genetic basis of that disease. A disagreement over the goals of genetic research ultimately devolved into litigation when the investigators patented discoveries against the wishes of the Canavan community, which would have preferred to keep discoveries in the public
136
domain.
The return of results is an intensely private conversation between
an investigator and a research subject yet, as Professor Post has noted,
“[T]here is no reason why public opinion might not be formed one
137
conversation at a time.” Individuals who discover they have a gene
variant of unknown clinical significance may organize themselves to
press for research to clarify its meaning. Yet such communities can
form only if people know they possess specific genes. Banning the return of genetic test results that lack clinical significance impedes
community formation and stifles this form of community-driven advocacy. Letting people learn which genes they have empowers them
to participate more effectively in the national debate about science
policy. Suppressing the return of uncertain or non-clinicallysignificant genetic test results has the effect of excluding such people,
even if this is not a conscious objective.
134

135
136
137

See generally REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION: PATIENT ADVOCACY AND
RESEARCH ETHICS 5 (2001) (“Today, more than ever, biomedical research is a public affair . . . . A new breed of patient advocate sits at the table with scientists and policymakers,
setting research agendas, planning studies, and considering how study results should affect clinical practice.”).
See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(discussing these efforts).
Id.
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 46 (2012); see also id. (discussing how private discussions between individuals and healthcare providers may cause individuals to support
legislation affecting the availability of specific treatments and noting that as long as
knowledge is potentially relevant to the formation of public opinion, there is no reason in
principle why it should constitutionally matter whether it is distributed to one individual
or to a thousand).
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Some in the research community may feel that scientists and medical professionals should decide which parts of the genome are worth
studying, without the interference of pesky genetic community advocates petitioning their government to fund a study of this or that
gene first. Even if this view has possible merits, it does not comport
with our nation’s Constitution. Given the limitations of the federal
research budget, which genes to study in which order is a matter of
public concern. All citizens—even scientifically naïve ones—have the
138
right to petition their government on matters of public concern.
Policies to suppress the return of non-clinically-significant genetic
test results implicitly presume that a society can reach optimal decisions about which genes to study if its citizens are kept behind a “veil
139
of ignorance” so that ordinary citizens, not knowing their own
genes, are unsure which lines of genetic research would benefit
140
Public ignorance, it might be argued, clears the field
themselves.
for dispassionate decision-making by the learned keepers of the human genome. The principle of better policy through public ignorance enjoys perennial support—not specifically here but in many
different policy contexts—but it is inconsistent with the First
Amendment.
B. Prior Censorship of Return of Results
Even commentators who support the return of results may call for
such conversations to be subject to prior review and regulation by
141
IRBs or other ethics bodies. Such proposals display a willingness to
suppress the speech of investigators whose utterances do not conform
142
to an ethics review board’s concept of what is ethical. A recent example was the 2011 advance notice of proposed rulemaking
138

139
140

141

142

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 24, 136–42 (1971).
Id. at 136–37 (“[Under the veil of ignorance, people] do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles
solely on the basis of general considerations.”).
See, e.g., Bookman et al., supra note 117, at 1037 (“The decision to report genetic results
should not depend solely on the discretion of the investigator, but should include a
broader range of perspectives as is found in Institutional Review Boards.”); Fabsitz et al.,
supra note 39, at 575 (calling for IRB review as a condition of discretionary return of results by investigators); Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 672–73 (describing use of an Informed Cohort Oversight Board to oversee return of results); Maschke, supra note 120, at
569–70 (describing various forms of ethics bodies used to oversee return of results from
research in biospecimen repositories).
See supra note 141.
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(“ANPRM”), in which HHS proposed that research with biospecimens should receive prior IRB review when results are going to be returned, even if the research otherwise would be “excused” from IRB
143
This proposal, still not implereview under the Common Rule.
mented as of this writing, displays a mentality that speech between investigators and participants is intrinsically perilous, triggering a need
for prior review. The bioethics literature has not adequately explored whether such speech restrictions are themselves ethically or
legally problematic.
In an article that otherwise emphasized respect for participants’
personhood and preferences to receive results, Holm and Taylor
found it unproblematic to interpose an Informed Cohort Oversight
Board (“ICOB”) to assess “what information can be effectively com144
municated in a manner sensitive to subjects’ health literacy.” The
ICOB, as described, seems very caring and deeply committed to protecting the interests of the research participants. Yet to have an external body, even a benevolent one, censor communications and tailor flows of information to each person’s perceived “literacy” has
disturbing aspects that elicit concern in other communication con145
texts.
The literacy of laypeople is not much admired in the bioethics literature: “Participant literacy, or lack thereof, causes a great deal of
146
“A 1993 study, repeated with the same retension in the system.”
sults in 2002, showed that forty-seven percent of U.S. adults ‘lack the
literacy skills needed to meet the demands of twenty-first century so147
ciety.’” If these statistics are true, does it follow that there is a bioethical imperative to limit what such people can be told? Speech restrictions seem an ill-fitting response to the problem of public
illiteracy. Walling illiterate people off from communication seems
unlikely to cure their illiteracy.
143

144
145

146
147

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,514–15 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.
46, 160, 164 and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 672–73.
Indeed, it is alarming to treat any right (even ones that do not relate to communication)
as a function of literacy. Thus literacy tests were abolished long ago as a precondition of
voter registration, mainly because of their use as an instrument of discrimination. Although literacy no doubt does help make a person a better-informed and more effective
voter, illiterate people still have rights among which the right to vote is one of the most
important.
Terry, supra note 112, at 709.
Id. (citing INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACAD., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO
END CONFUSION 146 (Lynn Nielsen-Bohlman et al. eds., 2004)).
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C. Examples of Proposed Restrictions
In its 1999 report, NBAC called for IRBs to develop guidelines for
return of results and specified that “these guidelines should reflect
the presumption that the disclosure of research results to subjects
148
NBAC recommended
represents an exceptional circumstance.”
that results be returned “only when” the results are “scientifically valid and confirmed,” and “have significant implications for the subject’s health concerns,” and “a course of action to ameliorate those
149
concerns is readily available.” NBAC’s “only when” language lends
itself to two possible interpretations. One interpretation is that if the
conditions are not met, the investigator need not return results (i.e.,
there is no duty). The alternative interpretation is that if the conditions are not met, the investigator should not return results. This latter interpretation entails content-based suppression of investigators’
speech.
As noted earlier, much of the bioethics literature has focused on
whether there is a duty for investigators to return research results.
Concluding that there is no duty to return results is not the same
thing as asserting that there is no right to do so. Unfortunately, the
literature often fails to specify whether it is discussing the duty or the
right to return results. Statements like NBAC’s recommendation to
150
return results “only when” certain conditions are met have led
many IRBs and commentators to conclude that speech bans may be
warranted when those conditions are not met. The notion that
speech bans are appropriate implicitly presumes that there is no right
for investigators and research subjects to engage in such communication.
A 2008 article by Wolf et al. similarly seems to advocate content151
based restrictions on the return of research results. This article delineates “when incidental findings should be returned, may be re152
It recommends that a
turned, and should not be returned.”
“[r]esearcher should not disclose IFs offering unlikely net benefit from
148

149
150
151

152

1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72. But see Terry, supra note 112, at 726 (suggesting that NBAC’s view may now be out-of-date, particularly in view of the quality and relevance of data from whole genome sequencing, which requires clear disclosure policies).
1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72.
Id.
Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 219, 235 (stating, in the 2008 study’s recommendations, “Do
not disclose” to research participants “information revealing a condition that is not likely to be
of serious health or reproductive importance” or “information whose likely health or reproductive
importance cannot be ascertained”).
Wolf, supra note 37, at 441 (summarizing the findings of the 2008 study by Wolf et al.,
supra note 42).
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the participant’s perspective, including ‘information whose likely
153
The
health or reproductive importance cannot be ascertained.’”
use of “should not” rather than “need not” suggests that this article is
not merely noting the absence of a duty to discuss results that lack
clinical or reproductive significance. It appears to be advocating content-based restrictions on investigators’ speech. On close reading,
however, the article acknowledges that “[t]here is a distinct debate on
returning research information at the request of research partici154
Thus, the article may not have intended to express any
pants.”
opinion about the investigator’s right to discuss results with a willing
research participant. Yet the “should not” language does seem to
contemplate banning or restricting certain types of speech.
155
In an influential 2006 article that reported recommendations of
the NHLBI Working Group on Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies, Bookman et al. discussed whether (and when) inves156
tigators have a duty to offer the return of research results. This article also noted that there is a “strong voice that supports the right of
157
This
participants to receive results that may be clinically useful.”
discussion of participants’ rights and investigators’ duties did not, however, explore investigators’ rights to communicate results to participants
who wish to receive them.
A separate NHLBI-sponsored working group paper in 2010 found
a duty to return results that have “important health implications”
when the risks are “established and substantial” and when the results
are “actionable” in the sense that there are established therapies or
158
This
preventive actions that could improve the clinical outcome.
duty would exist only if “[t]he test is analytically valid, and the disclosure plan complies with all applicable laws” and if the subject has
159
consented to the return of results. In situations where there is no
duty to return results, the NHLBI paper allowed that an investigator
“may choose” to return results if “all of the following apply”:
a. The investigator has concluded that the potential benefits of disclosure outweigh the risks from the participant’s perspective.
b. The investigator’s IRB has approved the disclosure plan.
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

See Wolf et al., supra note 43, at 372 (summarizing results of the 2008 study by Wolf et al.,
supra note 42).
Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 227 (emphasis omitted).
Bookman et al., supra note 117.
Id. at 1038–39 (discussing circumstances under which genetic results “should” be offered
to research participants).
Id. at 1035.
Fabsitz et al, supra note 39, at 575.
Id.

Feb. 2014]

RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE HUMAN GENOME

579

c. The test is analytically valid and the disclosure plan complies with all
applicable laws.
160
d. [and the participant has consented to the return of information].

These conditions still place significant burdens on the return of results. For example, the return of results would be subject to prior
IRB review, and investigators and participants would not be permitted to discuss the results of tests having uncertain analytical validity
even if the uncertainty is forthrightly disclosed. The NHLBI paper is
somewhat unusual, however, in the breadth of information it would
161
allow investigators to return. Subject to the conditions just listed, it
would grant them discretion to return “results related to reproductive
risks, personal meaning or utility, or health risks,” although some
members of the NHLBI working group dissented on the matter of
whether personal meaning to the participant is a proper basis for re162
turn.
It is clear that bioethical perspectives on the return of results disagree on many nuances and particulars, but the bioethical literature
displays fairly broad support for the following proposition: speech
restrictions that suppress the return of results may be justified when
the findings (1) are uncertain or are of questionable analytical validi163
ty, (2) lack a well-established clinical validity or reproductive signifi164
165
To facilitate furcance, or (3) lack clinical utility/actionability.
160
161

162
163

164

165

Id. at 577–78. The bracketed passage here summarizes a longer discussion in the original.
Id.; see also Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 671 (arguing that the personal meaning of
genomic information and patient preferences should inform decisions about return of
results). But see id. at 675 (discussing efforts to address the fact that within The Gene
Partnership, the primary results eligible for potential disclosure would not be known clinical variants incidentally discovered, but instead would be new and uncertain discoveries—novel variants, or novel understandings).
Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 578.
See, e.g., 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71 (“[M]ost [experts] believe that findings should not be conveyed unless they are confirmed and reliable and constitute clinically significant or scientifically relevant information.”); Parker, supra note 20, at 452 (“It
is generally, though not uniformly, agreed that unreliable results ought not be offered
back to individuals.”); Wolf, supra note 37, at 446 (“[W]e see a near-universal demand for
analytical validity as a precondition for informational return.”); see also Holm & Taylor,
supra note 121, at 676 (supporting disclosure of information even if its clinical significance is uncertain but requiring that it be analytically valid).
See, e.g., 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71; Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 235
(summarizing various recommendations); see also Maschke, supra note 120, at 559 (citing
the fact that most genetic research results have uncertain clinical significance as a reason
why many biobanks adopt a “no-return” policy). But see id. at 559–60 (noting that some
commentators contend that persons who contribute biospecimens for research should
have access to genetic test results even if the information is of uncertain clinical significance).
See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231.
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ther analysis of this proposition, this Article will refer to it as the “cautious” approach insofar as it seeks to restrict the communication of
genetic information to the individuals whose genomes are involved.
D. Ethical Justifications for Suppressing the Return of Results
Bioethicists cite various concerns that justify restricting the return
of results. Table 1 shows a sampling of these justifications. Some ethicists challenge whether returning results has value as a form of
communication. Other ethicists are concerned that returning results
may inflict various types of harm on participants and, potentially, on
their families and genetically similar communities. There also is concern that returning results may cause broader social and economic
harms to the public.
TABLE 1
ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTRICTING THE RETURN OF RESULTS

CHALLENGES TO THE VALUE OF THE COMMUNICATION
1. Individual findings are not “information” worth communicating.
“[P]reliminary results do not yet constitute ‘information’ since ‘until an
initial finding is confirmed, there is no reliable information’ to com166
municate to subjects . . . .’”
2. Returning results is ineffective: even if participants are not harmed by it, they
may fail to gain any benefits. Returning results may fail to help people
manage their health risks, because genetic risk is not an effective motiva167
tor of behavioral change.
CONCERNS ABOUT LISTENER VULNERABILITY
3. Returning results may expose participants to anxiety. Returning results could
168
cause participants to experience anxiety about their test results. In sit-

166

167
168

See 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71–72 (citing Charles R. MacKay, Ethical Issues
in Research Design and Conduct: Developing a Test to Detect Carriers of Huntington’s Disease, 6
IRB 1, 3 (1984)).
Parker, supra note 20, at 468–69.
1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71; Parker, supra note 20, at 470 (noting concerns about psychological impacts); Terry, supra note 112, at 713 (noting anxiety associ-
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uations where people’s biospecimens have been studied without their
consent, returning results could further upset them by making them
aware that their specimens were used in research without their
169
knowledge.
4. Participants may misunderstand their results. There is thought to be a high
risk that participants will misconstrue the meaning of their genetic test
170
results.
Laypeople may fail to appreciate the uncertainty of research
results and are prone to therapeutic misconception (the belief that research results are more useful for clinical purposes than the results actu171
ally are).
“[E]ven . . . confirmed findings may have some unforeseen
172
limitations.’”
5. Returning results may cause participants to make bad healthcare decisions that
harm them. Returning results could cause unnecessary (and possibly
173
harmful) medical interventions.
6. Returning results exposes participants to the risk of stigmatization or discrimination. Telling people their test results may place them at risk of stigmati174
zation or discrimination in employment or insurance. Communicating
genetic information to one individual may have impacts on genetically
similar family members and population groups, possibly subjecting them
175
to adverse impacts.
7. Participants’ preferences to receive return of results may not reflect what they actually want. Participants’ expressed preferences to receive their test results
176
177
178
may be unreliable, unstable over time, based on false beliefs or

169
170

171

172
173
174
175
176

ated with learning about risks, but indicating that some studies suggest that this effect is
less than previously thought).
Maschke, supra note 120, at 563.
See Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 670 (“[C]ommunicating genomic research results
has historically been opposed, by some, based on an assumption that therapeutic misconceptions are inevitable, that harm necessarily flows from a misconception and is unpreventable and incurable, and that such harm necessarily outweighs any potential benefit,
regardless of how benefit might be conceived or measured.” (citing Kohane & Taylor, supra note 112, at 1–2)).
See, e.g., Terry, supra note 112, 720–21; see also id. at 709 (discussing a study that found
that forty-seven percent of people lack the basic scientific “literacy” necessary for life in a
twenty-first-century society).
See 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71–72 (quoting MacKay, supra note 166, at 3)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 71.
Terry, supra note 112, at 712.
1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72–73.
Parker, supra note 20, at 475–477.
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179

or may be irra-

CONCERNS ABOUT BROADER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HARMS TO THE PUBLIC
8. Returning results may cause participants to over-consume follow-up healthcare
services. Returning results creates increased demand for follow-up care
and places burdens on scarce healthcare resources as participants seek to
181
clarify the impact of their genes.
9. The cost of returning results may harm the research enterprise. The high cost of
182
returning results could reduce the availability of funds for research.
Note, however, that much of the perceived cost comes from the cautious
view’s insistence that only high-quality, confirmed results should be returned. This insistence entails significant investment to enhance certainty prior to return of results.
10. Participants may corrupt genetic understanding as they attempt to decipher the
meaning of their test results. After receiving results, participants may draw
scientifically invalid conclusions based on blogs and other postings in
183
communities formed by laypeople who share particular genes.
Community beliefs may supplant valid science and propagate inaccurate “dis184
ease legends.”

The concerns listed in Table 1 may supply ethical justification for
suppressing the return of results, assuming of course that there is no
ethical objection to the paternalism implicit in keeping participants
185
uninformed for their own good. Yet ethical justification and legal
justification are two different things. Even if speech restrictions are
ethically justified, it may not be constitutional to enact speech restrictions into law. For example, impolite remarks can be highly un177

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

See id. at 474; see also Terry, supra note 112, at 706 (“[P]ersonal preferences can change
throughout the life course due to many circumstances.”); cf. Holm & Taylor, supra note
121, at 676 (“[Some commentators express] skepticism about whether preferences are actually durable, known by, and ascertainable from participants.”).
See Parker, supra note 20, at 461.
See id. at 463.
See id. at 466.
See Terry, supra note 112, at 723.
See Parker, supra note 20, at 467 ; cf. Jewell, supra note 119, at 664.
See Terry, supra note 112, at 715.
Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Parker, supra note 20, at 480 (“[P]aternalistic understanding of individuals’ well-being
can be justified in the context of research, even genomic research.”).
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ethical, but a law banning impolite speech almost surely would violate
the First Amendment. If the speech restrictions bioethicists recommend were imposed by force of law, it is not clear they would be constitutional. The remainder of this Article explores whether laws and
regulations restricting the return of results can be legally, as well as
ethically, justified.
III. THE LEGAL VIEW OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
The field of law has had a sustained engagement with problems
related to the suppression of free speech. Use of the First Amendment to protect free speech is of relatively recent origin, tracing to a
186
series of opinions Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in 1919.
Courts have subsequently decided many cases involving First
Amendment protection of speech and there is a large scholarly literature on the subject.
The fact that bioethicists sometimes espouse speech restrictions as
a tool of human-subject protection may reflect historical factors. First
Amendment doctrine continued to evolve after the 1970s, but modern research bioethics rests heavily on concepts and principles elabo187
rated in the 1970s era. The National Research Act of 1974 estab188
lished a National Commission that oversaw development of the
189
Belmont Report, published in 1979, which identifies ethical principles that continue to animate research bioethics. In 1978, this commission also enunciated a set of regulatory recommendations to be
190
reflected in the Common Rule. For much of the twentieth century,

186

187
188

189
190

Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 2353, 2356–59 (2000) (discussing Justice Holmes’s development of First Amendment law in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and Abrams v. United States, 50 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
National Research Act of 1974 (National Research Service Award Act of 1974), Pub. L.
No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, § 201 (enacting 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1, the precursor of today’s 42 U.S.C. § 300v-1, creating the National Commission and describing its role in developing substantive standards of human subject protection); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (Nov.
30, 1978) [hereinafter HEW, 1978 REPORT] (discussing the National Commission and reporting its findings).
BELMONT REPORT, supra note 111, at 23,192.
HEW, 1978 REPORT, supra note 188, at 56,175–83; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300v-1(b) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to consider and respond to recommendations of the National Commission and a successor commission when establishing the
Common Rule’s substantive standards of human subject protection).
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including well into the 1970s as this work was underway, the Supreme
Court viewed health care as having a special status that justified heavy
regulation, including speech restrictions, to promote health and safety interests: “When public and private actors invoked health concerns to justify their conduct, the Court often expressed less skepticism than when other reasons were invoked for public and private
191
conduct.”
192
This special status of health care eroded in subsequent decades.
A crucial event in its erosion was the emergence of the commercial
speech doctrine, which limits the regulation of speech even in healthrelated contexts. The Supreme Court enunciated this doctrine in a
1976 case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
193
Council, Inc. That decision struck down a state law that prohibited
advertising of prescription drug prices, and the doctrine continued to
194
The foundations of modern huevolve from that starting point.
man-subject protections trace back to an era when policymakers presumed it was legally unproblematic to suppress speech to promote
health and safety objectives. That presumption has changed, but the
field of bioethics has failed to change with it. The bioethical debate
about return of results at times seems out of touch with current First
Amendment realities.
A. Brief Summary of the First Amendment Framework
First Amendment doctrine recognizes three categories of speech,
with the degree of First Amendment protection a particular communication receives depending on which category of speech is involved.
The first category (“regulable speech”) includes various types of
communication that lie largely outside of First Amendment protection and can be regulated by the government, whether through state
or federal statutes and regulations or through state common law
(e.g., tort lawsuits). Scholars disagree about the breadth of speech

191

192
193
194

David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash Between the
Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective Protection from
Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 300 (2012).
See id. at 302 (noting that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts are increasingly
willing to challenge public health justifications for limitations on individual liberties).
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
See Coleen Klasmeier & Martin Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the
First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED.
315, 339–41 (2012) (discussing the strengthening of commercial speech doctrine in the
years after 1976).
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activity that is regulable.195 This disagreement is largely immaterial to
this discussion because common candidates for regulable speech—
things like “defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
196
produced with real children” —obviously have nothing to do with
the return of genetic test results. Two categories of speech regulation
are, however, potentially relevant to this discussion and will be examined in greater detail below. These are: (1) professional speech—
that is, the speech that lawyers, doctors, and other licensed professionals provide to clients and patients in the course of providing pro197
fessional services, and (2) speech regulation—particularly, regulation of health claims—that occurs pursuant to consumer-product
198
safety and other health and safety regulations.
The second category is commercial speech, which enjoys a meas199
ure of First Amendment protection although the government has a
200
constrained (but still considerable) power to regulate it. Commercial speech has been described as “speech proposing a commercial
201
transaction” or “speech . . . related to the economic interests of the
195

196
197
198

199

200

201

See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgements” of Scientific Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979, 1009
(2005) (“The Court has generally taken an ‘all-inclusive’ approach . . . asserting that all
speech receives First Amendment protection unless it falls with[in] certain narrow categories of expression . . . .”); see also, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with “Public Discourse”
as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 584, 591 (2011) (noting that the
“all-inclusive approach” (or, more precisely, the “presumptive all-inclusive approach”) is
the approach the Court has generally set forth, though with some exceptions, and noting
that, at times, the exceptions are over-counted by separately counting various legal scenarios that all share a common feature, e.g., that there is no constitutional protection of
false statements of fact). But see James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 492 (2011) (“[H]ighly protected
speech is the exception, with most other speech being regulable because of its content
with no discernible First Amendment constraint . . . .”).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).
See Post, supra note 56, at 947–48 (discussing the regulation of speech by physicians and
dentists).
See Orentlicher, supra note 191, at 299 (noting that the government historically was
granted more leeway to regulate speech for the purpose of safeguarding public health
than for advancing other state interests).
See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate positions in the scale of First
Amendment values . . . .” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (“Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all regulation of such speech is unconstitutional.”); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (noting the subordinate status of commercial speech and the
government’s ability to regulate it).
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
455–56) (internal quotation marks omitted); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
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speaker and its audience,”202 and it includes such things as advertis203
ing, creating and disseminating health records as part of a data204
mining business, and making health claims about a product (for
example, claiming that a vitamin prevents cancer or reduces the risk
205
of neural tube defects).
206
The third category is pure speech (also called noncommercial
speech, core First Amendment speech, or fully protected speech)
that receives the most robust constitutional protection. Scholars dis207
agree about the precise scope of fully protected speech, but there is
general agreement that it includes, at the very least, such things as
208
political speech—“[d]iscussion of public issues” and the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and so209
cial changes desired by the people” —as well as artistic expression
210
and scholarly and scientific debate.
Concerns raised earlier in this Article hint at the possibility that
the return of results may include elements of core First Amendment

202
203
204
205

206

207

208
209
210

471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
Id.
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (“[T]he creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”).
See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying commercial speech doctrine in a First Amendment challenge to FDA restrictions on health
claims that dietary supplements and food fiber can reduce the risks of certain cancers and
neural tube defects); Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2002) (applying commercial speech doctrine in a First Amendment challenge to FDA restrictions
on claims that anti-oxidants reduce the risk of cancer); Alliance for Natural Health US v.
Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying commercial speech doctrine
in a First Amendment challenge to FDA restrictions on claims concerning selenium and
cancer); Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011)
(applying commercial speech doctrine in a challenge to FDA restrictions on claims that
vitamins C and E prevent cancer).
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 1998) (contrasting the First Amendment frameworks for pure speech and commercial speech), vacated on other grounds, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 195, at 567 (arguing that labels such as “public discourse” and
“speech on matters of public concern” are not adequate for delimiting the range of
speech that is protected by the First Amendment); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 625–29 (1982) (exploring the normative position that all
human expression should receive First Amendment protection).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (noting that scientific and academic speech is entitled to
the highest level of First Amendment protection).
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speech.211 While this may be true, the analysis that follows will rely
primarily on the commercial speech doctrine. This reflects a pragmatic choice about study design: the goal here is to test whether the
First Amendment protects the communication that occurs when an
investigator returns results to a research participant. The more rigorous test of this hypothesis is to analyze the return of results under
the assumption that it is merely commercial speech, if indeed it is
constitutionally protected at all. If the commercial speech doctrine
protects this communication, then it would be all the more protected
if return of results were conceived as core First Amendment speech.
The reliance on commercial speech analysis is thus the more stringent and skeptical way to test this Article’s hypothesis.
B. Protection of Commercial Speech
Until 1976, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment
as placing no constraint on the government’s ability to regulate
212
Since that time, commercial speech has recommercial speech.
ceived a measure of First Amendment protection. Early commercial
213
speech cases referred to this as a “limited measure of protection” to
emphasize that commercial speech holds a “subordinate position in
214
In a recent case, Sorrell v.
the scale of First Amendment values.”
215
IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court at times seemed to suggest that
commercial speech has parity with pure (noncommercial) speech
but, in fact, the Court did not announce a new standard for protecting commercial speech and ultimately decided the case using the
same analytical framework it has been using in commercial speech
cases for over thirty years. This framework is called the Central Hud216
son test, named for the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
211
212

213

214
215
216

See discussion supra notes 18–36 and notes 123–37 and accompanying text.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,762
(1976) (recognizing a degree of constitutional protection for commercial speech); see also
Post, supra note 200, at 2.
Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)(emphasis added) (“[C]ommercial speech
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values . . . .” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).
Id.
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Id. at 2667–68 (deciding the case under standards enunciated in Cenral. Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), which are associated
with commercial speech cases and are less strict than the tests courts apply in cases involving core First Amendment speech); see also id. at 2667 (“[T]he outcome is the same
whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”).
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v. Public Service Commission of New York217 that first enunciated it. After
courts determine that a communication is commercial speech, they
use the four-step Central Hudson test to analyze whether laws regulating that speech are constitutional.
At Step One, courts ask whether the speech is non-misleading and
218
concerns lawful activity. If the speech is found to be misleading or
relates to an illegal activity, that is the end of the analysis: the speech
is not entitled to any constitutional protection and the government
219
may regulate it. If, on the other hand, the speech is non-misleading
and is not about an unlawful activity, the speech is eligible for consti220
The government still may be able to regulate
tutional protection.
the speech, but the regulations must satisfy three constraints. The
remainder of the Central Hudson test focuses not on the speech, but
on the specific regulation that is the subject of the First Amendment
challenge. Steps Two–Four of the Central Hudson test check that the
regulation satisfies each of the three constraints.
At Step Two, courts ask whether the government’s asserted inter221
est in regulating the speech is “substantial.” Unless the government
asserts an important reason for regulating commercial speech, courts
will find the regulation unconstitutional at this step in the analysis.
Assuming the government has enunciated a substantial interest
that it is trying to protect, courts move to Step Three, which asks
222
whether the regulation directly advances that interest. If regulating
commercial speech only will have a tenuous or indirect impact on the
problem the government is trying to solve, courts will find the regulation unconstitutional at this step in the analysis.
Finally, if the regulation passed the earlier tests, courts move to
Step Four and ask whether the regulation is more extensive than is
223
necessary to serve the interest. For example, did the regulation ban
speech altogether when requiring a warning or disclosure would have
solved the problem? Even if the government is trying to protect an
important interest, and even if the regulation contributes in a positive
way to the government’s objective, the regulation still will be uncon-

217

218
219
220
221
222
223

See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64, 566 (striking down regulations that banned promotional advertising by utility companies even though the state claimed that the ban would
encourage energy conservation and prevent inequities in utility rates).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
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stitutional if the regulation has a more draconian impact on free
speech than was necessary.
This overview of the Central Hudson test raises a number of practical questions in the context of return of results. For example, what
does it mean for speech to be misleading? Does returning a genetic
test result to a person who failed eighth-grade biology count as misleading speech? If the CLIA regulations require labs to be CLIAcertified in order to return results, would returning results from a
224
non-CLIA-certified lab be speech “related to unlawful activity”?
What types of government interests count as substantial? What does
it mean for a regulation to advance the government’s interest directly
and be no more extensive than necessary? The best way to answer
these questions is with examples of how the Central Hudson test has
been applied in relevant court cases that raised issues similar to those
encountered in returning results.
Before turning to that task, Table 2 shows the range of outcomes
that can occur under this test. The Central Hudson test grants the
government considerable leeway to regulate commercial speech. The
government can, for example, require speakers to make disclosures
or it can impose prior restraints on what can be communicated (for
example, by requiring statements to be backed by scientific evi225
A well-designed, well-justified regulation of commercial
dence).
speech can survive the four-factor analysis and be found constitutional. As the Court noted in Sorrell v. IMS Health, “the government’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from commercial harms
explains why commercial speech can be subject to greater govern226
On the
mental regulation than noncommercial [pure] speech.”
other hand, regulations that are poorly designed or inadequately justified will fail the test and be deemed unconstitutional. Thus, commercial speech may turn out to be regulable, if the regulation satisfies
the Central Hudson criteria.

224
225
226

Id. at 564.
See Post, supra note 200, at 1 (“[T]he state can compel disclosures, impose overbroad regulations, and establish prior restraints within the domain of commercial speech . . . .”).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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TABLE 2
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES UNDER THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH

MAY THE GOVERNMENT REGULATE THE
SPEECH?

Commercial speech that is
misleading or related to an
unlawful activity

Yes. Regulations that restrict this speech
are constitutional. This speech is ineligible
for constitutional protection and is regulable speech.

Commercial speech that is
neither misleading nor related
to an unlawful activity

Yes, if the regulation meets certain criteria. This
speech is eligible for constitutional protection but it nevertheless can be regulated
provided that the government has a substantial interest and the regulation directly advances that interest and is no more extensive than it needs to be. Regulations that
meet these criteria are constitutional and
the commercial speech in question is regulable.
No, if the regulation fails to meet the criteria.
This speech is eligible for constitutional
protection, and regulations that fail to
meet the criteria just described are unconstitutional. The speech is protected by the
First Amendment.

IV. IS RETURN OF RESULTS PROTECTED AS COMMERCIAL
SPEECH?
Investigators who return genetic test results do so gratis for the
perceived benefit of research participants and, in many cases, the investigators are not even physicians who could supply the follow-up
care that the participants may seek after learning their genetic test results. Part IV.A explains why the return of results nevertheless has attributes of commercial speech. Then, Parts IV.B–IV.D draw on relevant case law to apply the various steps of Central Hudson to the return
of results. Finally, Part IV.E explores whether the concept of regula-
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ble professional speech might justify placing restrictions on the return of results and concludes that it does not.
A. Why Return of Results Can Be Characterized as Commercial Speech
If the return of results is in the nature of noncommercial (pure)
speech, then it would be very hard to justify the restrictions that law
and bioethics place on investigators’ communications with research
participants. The more stringent test of whether such restrictions are
constitutional is to proceed under the hypothesis that return of results may merely be commercial speech. This characterization is
plausible for reasons discussed below.
Return of results has promotional aspects. Returning results promotes
a commercial transaction. The commercial transaction is the research itself or, more specifically, the procurement of a critical input
(research participants) for the research. There is considerable evidence suggesting that people’s willingness to contribute their biospecimens or otherwise volunteer for genetic research depends on
227
whether they will receive return of results. One survey found that
“[t]he most influential factor affecting the respondent’s willingness
to participate in the study seemed to be the offer of individualized re228
sults.” Restricting investigators’ ability to return research results potentially interferes with their ability to procure raw materials, such as
biospecimens, for research. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman
defined advertising as communications “emphasizing desirable quali229
ties so as to arouse a desire to buy or patronize.” Returning results
emphasizes an aspect of research that many prospective participants
find desirable: the chance to learn about the genome including
one’s own. Such considerations need not be the sole motive, in order
for return of results to have a promotional effect.
A related question is whether federally funded genetic research is
“commercial.” Modern courts characterize research as a commercial
activity unless it is “solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
230
for strictly philosophical inquiry” —a standard that little if any NIH227

228
229
230

See Parker, supra note 20, at 471–72 (discussing various studies of participants’ preferences concerning return of results and whether return of results influenced their willingness to volunteer for research); Terry, supra note 112, at 708–09 (noting that one study
found that people’s willingness to contribute to a research biobank was tied to there being a binding agreement addressing return of results).
Parker, supra note 20, at 472.
Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988)).
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

592

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

funded genetic research is able to measure up to (or, perhaps, down
to). Research, including federally funded basic scientific research at
231
academic institutions, has commercial aspects. Even when research
does nothing more than increase the institution’s status or create
learning opportunities for its students and faculty, the research “unmistakably further[s] the institution’s legitimate business objec232
233
tives.” After passage of the Bayh-Dole amendments, many institutions reap direct commercial benefits by patenting discoveries from
their federally funded research.
Return of results is primarily informational rather than expressive speech.
An investigator returning results to a research participant generally
does so not as an act of personal self-expression but in order to inform the listener. It is true that the act of returning results includes
some expressive elements that convey an investigator’s point of view
on matters of public concern. For example, returning uncertain test
results might express the investigators’ view that research participants
are more intelligent and better able to grasp uncertainty than some
IRBs and regulators give them credit for. Returning results might
express the investigator’s support for a shift to a participatory model
of health care that disrupts the power of traditional intermediaries
and gatekeepers. It might even express a belief that laws restricting
the return of results are bad policy deserving of civil disobedience.
Thus, it cannot be denied that the return of results may include elements of pure (noncommercial) speech.
That said, the return of results is primarily informational rather
than expressive speech: its goal is to convey information to the listener. This fact is consistent with the view that it is commercial
speech. When commercial and pure (noncommercial) speech are
inextricably intertwined, as they arguably may be in the context of returning results, a strong case can be made for treating the entire
communication as fully protected speech deserving the highest de234
gree of First Amendment protection. I do not, however, press that
case here because, treating return of results as commercial speech
235
provides a more rigorous test of this Article’s hypothesis.

231
232
233
234

235

See id. at 1362–63 (noting that research done by a university may increase the status of the
institution and lure lucrative research grants, students, and faculty).
Id. at 1362.
For the Bayh-Dole amendments, see 35 U.S.C §§ 200–212 (2006).
See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (discussing whether commercial and pure
speech were inextricably intertwined, such that “the entirety must . . . be classified as
noncommercial”).
See discussion supra Introduction.
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The commercial speech doctrine pays heed to the interests of listeners. American free speech doctrine tends to be speaker-oriented
because the First Amendment protects rights of speakers rather than
236
rights of listeners. The speaker’s right of self-expression is a major
concern in many pure (noncommercial) speech contexts: the First
Amendment protects the right of speakers to associate themselves
with particular political, religious, moral, or cultural viewpoints. In
contrast, the commercial speech doctrine often values speech for its
237
informational function, as opposed to its expressive function. Valuing speech for its informational content implicitly treats audience in238
terests as an important concern. “Commercial expression not only
serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers
and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination
239
First Amendment protection of commercial
of information.”
speech rejects the “highly paternalistic” view that it benefits listeners
to regulate or suppress speech and instead assumes that “people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of
240
communication rather than to close them.”
Various modes of communication can qualify as “speech” for First
Amendment purposes. Sorrell v. IMS Health challenged a Vermont
law that restricted data-mining companies’ ability to disseminate prescriber-identifying pharmacy records for use in drug marketing and
also restricted drug companies’ use of such records in drug detailing
241
(marketing visits). The State of Vermont argued that it could regulate the sale of data because such sales are “conduct” rather than
242
“speech.” The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that earlier cases
have “held that the creation and dissemination of information are
243
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.” In the same
way, testing people’s genomes and telling them the results constitutes
speech as well as conduct. “Facts, after all, are the beginning point

236
237

238
239
240
241
242
243

See Weinstein, supra note 195, at 498 (noting that American free speech doctrine focuses
heavily on the rights of the speaker).
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising.”).
Id.; see also Post, supra note 200, at 1 (“[C]ommercial speech is protected because of its
informational function.”).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
Id. at 2666.
Id. at 2667.
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for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human
knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First
244
Amendment purposes.” By this same reasoning, genetic test results
are speech. The Supreme Court has commented that “[t]he First
Amendment protects even dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression. A restriction on disclosure is a
245
regulation of speech.” In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court
noted that a listener’s “concern for the free flow of commercial
speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
246
dialogue” and remarked, “That reality has great relevance in the
fields of medicine and public health, where information can save
247
lives.”
Return of results is speech involving health claims. Return of results often includes health claims: claims that a particular gene variant does
or does not have a particular impact on human health. Courts consistently apply commercial speech doctrine in cases involving health
248
claims. This body of case law is highly relevant to the return of results because health-claims cases frequently have forced courts to analyze the problem of listener vulnerability in contexts where speech
conveys information that is scientifically complex or uncertain. The
relevant line of cases involved First Amendment challenges to regulations that restrict the claims that manufacturers can make about their
products. Regulations restricting health and environmental claims
typically take the form of evidentiary requirements: before it is legal
to make a claim, the claim must be scientifically validated according
249
A familiar example is the FDA
to specific evidentiary standards.
244
245
246
247
248

249

Id.
Id. at 2666–67 (citing IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 2010) and
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (D. Vt. 2009)).
Id. at 2664 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2664.
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
that courts consistently apply commercial speech doctrine in health claims cases and
providing a list of examples).
See id. (citing examples of cases that involved challenges to regulations imposing evidentiary requirements on health and environmental claims); see also Richard A. Samp, Courts
Are Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug Administration Speech Regulation, 58 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 313, 314 (2003) (“[E]very major lawsuit challenging FDA speech restrictions
has proceeded under the assumption that the speech in question is commercial in character.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated
Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 397 (2011) (indicating that a survey
of case law as of 2012 continues to support Samp’s observation). See generally healthclaims cases cited infra Part IV.
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drug regulatory framework, which requires manufacturers to provide
the agency with specific types of clinical evidence proving that a drug
is safe and effective in its indicated uses before the drug can be labeled or promoted for those uses.
As discussed earlier, there is a fair degree of consensus among bioethicists that suppressing the return of results may be appropriate if
the results are uncertain or lack analytical validity, clinical validity,
250
This cautious view is, in essence,
and clinical utility/actionability.
an attempt to subject the return of results to health-claims regulation.
This view would suppress the return of results that fail to meet particular standards of scientific evidence. The relationship between a test
analyte (such as a gene or other biomarker) and a particular health
impact must be scientifically established before the analyte can be
discussed with participants. That amounts to health-claims regulation.
Regulating health claims puts a burden on free speech by suppressing claims that fail to meet the required standard of evidence.
Listener vulnerability is a possible rationale for imposing this burden.
As bioethicists have noted, listeners may be unqualified to assess the
validity of scientific claims or they may respond inappropriately to
251
In such circumstances, it may make sense
uncertain information.
to appoint a regulator or other learned body to police the quality of
claims that can be made. Traditionally, regulators in the United
States enjoyed wide latitude to use speech restrictions as a tool to
252
promote health and safety objectives, and health-claims regulations
were largely uncontroversial. This began to change after the com253
mercial speech doctrine emerged in the late 1970s.
There is a modern trend to subject health and safety regulations
254
to greater First Amendment scrutiny, generally under the commer255
cial speech doctrine. In recent years, the FDA repeatedly has faced
First Amendment challenges in various contexts where the agency
was attempting to protect the public from health claims that, in the

250
251
252

253
254
255

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II and Table 1.
See Orentlicher, supra note 191, at 300 (“When private or public actors invoked health
concerns to justify their conduct, the Court often expressed less skepticism than when
other reasons were invoked for public or private conduct.”).
Id. at 302 (noting erosion of the special status of health care as a justification for regulation).
Id. at 299.
See Samp, supra note 249, at 314; see also Cortez, supra note 249, at 397.
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agency’s view, were scientifically uncertain.256 For example, a 2002
257
case, Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, challenged the agen258
cy’s efforts to restrict advertising by compounding pharmacies.
These pharmacies offer custom-made drugs for patients who need
special preparations (for example, if the patient is allergic to an inactive ingredient in the standard preparation). The FDA does not subject compounded drugs to the same clinical trial and premarket review requirements that apply to ordinary new drugs. Consequently,
advertising of compounded drugs has the potential to promote drugs
with poorly validated safety and effectiveness. In order to protect the
public, the agency sought to restrict such advertising. The Supreme
Court held that these restrictions violated the First Amendment.
Other cases have challenged the agency’s efforts to restrict off-label
259
Off-label promotion inpromotion of drugs and medical devices.
volves health claims that have not been validated according to the
agency’s usual evidentiary standards. The First Amendment con260
strains the FDA’s ability to restrict speech about off-label uses. Still
other cases have challenged the agency’s regulation of health claims
261
for foods and dietary supplements.
256

257
258

259

260
261

See Cortez, supra note 249, at 395–97 (listing twenty-four cases in which firms subject to
various forms of FDA regulation—including drug, device, compounding pharmacy, dietary supplement, and food regulation—have claimed First Amendment protection).
535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Id. at 367–68 (treating advertising by a compounding pharmacy as commercial speech
that was entitled to First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the fact that the restrictions were intended to promote health).
See, e.g., United States. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 158–162 (2d Cir. 2012) (vacating the
conviction of a pharmaceutical sales representative for promoting off-label use of a drug,
holding that the government had prosecuted the defendant for his speech, and that such
prosecution violated the First Amendment); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13
F. Supp. 2d. 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that the FDA violated the First Amendment by
placing certain restrictions on drug manufacturers’ ability to disseminate reprints that
discuss off-label uses and by restricting their involvement in continuing medical education seminars and symposia); see also United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d. 935, 939 (7th Cir.
2008) (criticizing the FDA’s ban on off-label promotion on First Amendment grounds but
deciding the case on other grounds); Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 194, at 338–50 (arguing that the FDA’s current ban on drug manufacturers’ promotion of off-label uses of
drugs is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds).
See supra note 259.
See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring the
FDA, under the commercial speech doctrine, to consider whether including appropriate
disclaimers—as opposed to banning speech altogether—would negate potentially misleading nature of manufacturer’s claims that dietary supplements and food fiber can reduce the risks of certain cancers and neural tube defects); Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2002) (granting preliminary injunction removing the FDA’s ban
on health claims in dietary supplement labeling after finding that the claims were not inherently misleading and were only potentially deceptive); Alliance for Natural Health US
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Health-claims cases exemplify the point that the Central Hudson
test can produce varying outcomes, depending on how well the particular speech restrictions are designed and how well the agency justifies its need to regulate the claims. In food and dietary supplement
health-claims cases, courts have found some challenged speech restrictions to be unconstitutional while finding others to be permissible regulation of commercial speech. Thus, some health claims are
regulable speech, while other health claims are eligible to and actually do receive constitutional protection. Health claims that appear in
the labeling of FDA-approved drugs are regulable speech because—at
262
least to date —the FDA premarket approval process for validating
these claims continues to be regarded as a permissible regulation of
free speech. In contrast, advertising of compounded drugs and various forms of speech promoting off-label uses of drugs have been held
to be commercial speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
Health-claims cases go both ways.
Even when a government agency has an extensive mandate to
regulate the safety of drugs, devices, or other products and services,
this does not necessarily imply that the agency can suppress speech as
a way to promote that objective:
[T]he argument that a certain subset of speech may be considered completely outside of the First Amendment framework because the speech
occurs in an area of extensive government regulation is a proposition
whose continuing validity is at best questionable in light of the Supreme
263
Court’s most recent commercial speech cases.
[T]he Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more
dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct. That presumption accords
with the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a democratic society. As a result, the First Amendment directs that the govern264
ment may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct.

These principles have obvious importance in the context of return of
results. Even though the CLIA authorizes the CMS to ensure the

262

263

264

v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring, on First Amendment grounds,
that the FDA consider whether inclusion of disclaimers would negate potentially misleading effect of manufacturer’s claims concerning selenium and cancer and also holding
that the FDA’s replacement of a claim related to prostate cancer risk was inconsistent with
the First Amendment).
See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health
Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 246 (2011) (“Recent Supreme Court
precedent in this area suggests that the FDA’s blanket prohibition on off-label promotion
could be ripe for challenge.”).
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 60; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 567 n.10 (1980) (“Several commercial speech decisions have involved enterprises subject to extensive state regulation.”).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996).
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quality of laboratory testing, and even though OHRP has authority to
ensure ethical treatment of human research subjects, these mandates
do not necessarily empower the agencies to suppress speech to promote those objectives. “[S]peech restrictions cannot be treated as
simply another means that the government may use to achieve its
265
ends.” Using experimental tests to study biospecimens is a form of
conduct and the government, if it has a good reason to do so, can
regulate or even ban such conduct. The fact that the government
could ban experimental testing does not, however, imply that the
266
government can ban speech about experimental test results. To determine whether specific legal restrictions on the return of results violate the Constitution, it is necessary to analyze them using the fourfactor Central Hudson framework.
B. Is the Return of Results Eligible for Constitutional Protection?
The first step of Central Hudson analysis examines characteristics of
the speech itself. “For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis267
The analysis below concludes that the return of results
leading.”
satisfies both these criteria, based on how courts have applied them
in relevant commercial speech cases.
Return of results is speech related to a lawful activity. Return of results
is not the type of speech that Central Hudson refers to as “speech relat268
ed to illegal activity.” Even if a state law, the CLIA regulations, or
an IRB acting pursuant to the Common Rule has “banned” the return of results, an investigator who defies the ban and returns results
is not engaging in speech related to unlawful activity. Courts addressed a virtually identical question in cases challenging FDA re269
strictions on off-label promotion of drugs and medical devices. In
270
one of those cases, the FDA argued that the speech concerned unlawful activity because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits
265
266

267
268
269

270

Id.
Id. (rejecting the reasoning of an earlier case, Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass’n v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), which had held that the government’s power to regulate
casino gambling implied a power to regulate speech about casino gambling).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
Id. at 564.
See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d. 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998)
(determining that off-label promotion of drugs is not speech related to an unlawful activity); United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (addressing this
question in a case involving a man who was facing criminal charges for violating an FDA
ban on off-label promotion of medical devices).
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
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manufacturers’ speech about off-label uses of medical products.
“The court properly rejected this argument stating that the ‘proper
inquiry is not whether the speech violates a law or regulation, but ra271
ther whether the conduct the speech promotes violates the law.’”
An advertisement seeking to sell illegal narcotics or soliciting
272
prostitutes would qualify as speech concerning unlawful activity. In
contrast, talking about a lawful use of a legal medical product or
about a lawfully conducted genetic test simply does not qualify.
“Promotion of off-label uses does not promote unlawful activity because off-label use of drugs and medical devices by physicians is not
273
unlawful.” In the same way, telling a participant his or her genetic
test results is not speech related to an unlawful activity. Rather, it is
speech about genetic testing. If it was lawful to conduct the test, then
returning results from the test is speech related to lawful activity for
purposes of Central Hudson analysis.
Contrasting concepts of vulnerability in bioethics and law. Whether off274
label promotion is misleading is a “closer question” and the same is
true of return of results. As summarized in Table 1, bioethicists express various concerns about the return of results and many of these
are rooted in the belief that scientifically uncertain or poorly validated genetic test results will mislead research participants. For exam275
ple, the participants may misunderstand their results; these misun276
derstandings may lead to anxiety or bad healthcare decisions; and
participants may propagate their misunderstandings to other people,
277
adding to public confusion about the human genome. These concerns cast research participants as vulnerable, incompetent listeners
who may misunderstand and respond in inappropriate ways to what
they are told.
The field of law also recognizes concerns about listener vulnerability. Professor Post has observed that First Amendment protection
of speech seems to depend somewhat on characteristics of the listener: First Amendment doctrine seems to protect a sphere of communication between people who “are presumed to be independent and
self-possessed,” but is less likely to protect “communications between
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (emphasis added) (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66).
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973).
Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S.
341, 350 (2001)).
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21.
See supra Part II, Table 1, item 4.
Id. at items 3, 5, and 8.
Id. at item 10.
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persons deemed to be involved in relationships of dependence or re278
liance.” By this view, First Amendment doctrine protects speech in
situations where the listeners are conceived as autonomous, selfdetermining individuals, but when listeners are conceived as vulnerable and not able to discern their own best interests, there is a greater
willingness to let the government regulate what the listeners can be
told.
The problem with this concern is that virtually all speech is misleading if one presumes a sufficiently unsophisticated listener. Suppressing speech can inflict real injuries on speakers and listeners
279
“To allow [communication] to be fettered is to fetter ouralike.
280
selves.” It compounds an insult with an injury to declare people naïve and then cite their alleged naiveté as a reason to wall them off
from communication. As a federal appeals court noted in a First
Amendment case involving regulation of scientifically uncertain
health claims, “If the protections afforded commercial speech are to
retain their force, we cannot allow rote invocation of the words ‘potentially misleading’ to supplant the [government’s] burden to
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
281
The Supreme
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”
Court maintains that “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere specula282
tion or conjecture.”
While law and bioethics both recognize the problem of listener
vulnerability, law is somewhat more cautious about asserting that
people are vulnerable as a reason to forbid others to speak to them.
When bioethicists assert that people are vulnerable or incompetent,
this often is done with the best motives and in a spirit of erring on the
side of protecting people. Lawyers perhaps take a more jaundiced
view of such assertions, having often seen them made with nefarious
motives (for example, adult child seeks to have mom declared incompetent with the aim of taking control of her assets).
The legal concept of misleading speech. Rote assertions that return of
283
results is misleading may be enough to convince bioethicists that it
278
279

280
281

282
283

Post, supra note 200, at 23.
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” (citing N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971))).
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (speaking of a free press).
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Ibanez v. Fla.
Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993).
Id.
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is appropriate to suppress speech, but they would not convince a
court. “Because there is a constitutional presumption in favor of
speech, a defendant has the burden of proof to rebut that presump284
In
tion with evidence that the speech is inherently misleading.”
First Amendment cases where a speaker is challenging a speech restriction, the defendant is the proponent of the speech restriction
(usually a state or the federal government). Thus, the party who
285
wants to restrict speech has the burden to prove it is misleading.
“[M]ost courts have become increasingly demanding in insisting that
regulatory restrictions be buttressed by hard evidence supporting the
286
necessity of such restrictions.”
Courts recognize a distinction between speech that is inherently
287
Inhermisleading and speech that is only potentially misleading.
ently misleading commercial speech is not entitled to constitutional
288
protection and the government may regulate it or ban it altogether.
If speech is only potentially misleading, it is eligible for constitutional
protection and the government can regulate it only if the other three
Central Hudson factors are met (that is, if there is a substantial government interest that is directly advanced by the regulation, which
289
must be no more extensive than necessary).
Central Hudson considered speech inherently misleading if it was
290
An earlier
“more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”
case had formulated this concept by saying that the speech “more of291
292
ten than not will be injurious.” Some cases, although it arguably
is simplistic to do so, seem to relate the distinction between potential284
285

286
287

288

289
290
291
292

Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180 (D. Colo. 2001) (citing
Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 106 F.3d 929, 932–33 (10th Cir. 1997)).
See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71 (“[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”).
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 6:2 (updated Oct. 2013).
Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2002) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court had recognized a distinction between inherently and potentially misleading
speech even before Central Hudson) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages
that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.” (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447,
464 (1978)).
See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I),
13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998); Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1210.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464).
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing
various types of health claims).
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ly and inherently misleading claims to the distinction between true
claims and false or deceptive claims. Thus, “[t]ruthful advertising” is
293
constitutionally protected, but the government is “free to prevent
the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
294
misleading.” Showing that a claim is true strongly militates against
the conclusion that it is inherently misleading, even if listeners are
apt to form a false impression from it. However, the concept of “deceptive” leaves the door slightly ajar for a factually true statement
nevertheless to be inherently misleading. Some courts take the view
that “speech is only ‘inherently misleading’ if it would be misleading
295
in all circumstances” and treat speech as merely “potentially mis296
leading” if it is misleading in some circumstances but not in others.
Some courts consider that for “a particular mode of communication
to be inherently misleading, it must be incapable of being presented
297
in a way that is not deceptive.” Simply declaring that speech is inherently misleading is not sufficient to justify restrictions on speech:
Whether speech is “inherently misleading” . . . is a determination for the
court, not the legislature [or regulators], to make. If a legislature could
place speech outside of First Amendment protection by simply declaring
the speech “inherently misleading,” the First Amendment to the United
States would be subject to de facto modification by state legislatures.
298
Clearly, this would violate the Supremacy Clause.

“Whether speech is inherently misleading depends upon . . . the
possibilities for deception, whether experience has proved that in fact
that such advertising is subject to abuse, and the ability of the intend299
ed audience to evaluate the claims made.” The listener’s sophistication is one factor courts consider but it is not necessarily dispositive.
In United States v. Caputo, which involved off-label promotion of a
medical device, the court noted the fact that the promotion was di293
294
295
296

297
298

299

R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638
(1985) (citing Friedman, 440 U.S. at 1).
Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1181 (D. Colo. 2001).
Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 730–31 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 812 (1995) (determining that environmental claims using the terms “ozone friendly,” “biodegradable,” “photodegradable,” “recyclable,” and “recycled” were only potentially misleading).
See, e.g., Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 106 F.3d 929, 933 (10th Cir.
1997) (citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
Bioganic, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (stating that whether speech is inherently misleading is
a “question of law”).
Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66–67 (D.D.C. 1998) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Caputo, 288 F.
Supp. 2d 912, 920−21 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51).

Feb. 2014]

RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE HUMAN GENOME

603

rected at physicians, a sophisticated audience, before concluding that
300
But courts sometimes
the speech was not inherently misleading.
301
focus on other factors. In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,
an off-label drug promotion case, the court focused primarily on the
nature and intrinsic reliability of the speech (which involved distrib302
uting peer-reviewed articles that discussed off-label uses) in con303
cluding that it was not inherently misleading.
When cases involve uncertain or poorly substantiated health and
environmental claims, a key question is whether adding a disclosure
304
or disclaimer would “suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness.”
Whether to ban speech or simply require disclosures is mainly a question for Step Four of Central Hudson analysis, when courts consider
whether the government’s speech restrictions are more extensive
than they need to be. However, disclosures also may be relevant during Step One as courts decide whether speech is inherently misleading. If adding a disclosure would make speech non-misleading, this
tends to suggest that the speech is only potentially misleading, and
the proper response may be to regulate it by requiring the needed
305
If the problem simply cannot be cured by
warning or disclosure.
adding disclaimers, then the speech may well be inherently mislead306
ing such that an outright ban is justified. Thus, the effectiveness of
disclaimers is mainly a question for Step Four, but it also may be relevant during Step One of Central Hudson analysis.
Are poorly substantiated health claims inherently misleading? An influ307
ential case on these issues is Pearson v. Shalala (“Pearson I”) involving
a First Amendment challenge to restrictions the FDA imposed on
300
301
302
303
304

305

306

307

Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68−69.
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (not ruling out the possibility that it would be permissible for the FDA to ban a claim outright if the claim’s misleading nature was “incurable by a disclaimer” (citing FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42−43 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[T]he States may not place an absolute
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the information
also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.”); see also Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 659
(“The government’s general concern that . . . consumers might assume that a claim on a
supplement’s label is approved by the government, suggests an obvious answer: The
agency could require the label to state that ‘The FDA does not approve this claim.’”).
See Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[Pearson I]
clearly ruled that the FDA may not prohibit a health claim unless it first makes a ‘showing’ that the claim’s alleged ‘misleadingness’ could not be cured through the use of a disclaimer or other types of disclosure.”).
Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 650.
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health claims for dietary supplements. In Pearson I, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether “health claims lacking ‘significant scientific agreement’ are inherently misleading and thus entirely
308
The agency had
outside the protection of the First Amendment.”
asserted its “common sense judgment” that it advances consumers’
health for the FDA to ban health claims that have not been approved
309
by the agency under a “significant scientific agreement” standard.
The court of appeals stated that it regarded “as dubious any justifica310
tion that is based on the benefits of public ignorance” and rejected
the FDA’s assertion in scathing terms:
As best we understand the government, its [argument] runs along the
following lines: that health claims lacking “significant scientific agreement” are inherently misleading because they have such an awesome impact on consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them to exercise
any judgment at the point of sale. It would be as if the consumers were
asked to buy something while hypnotized, and therefore they are bound
311
to be misled. We think this contention is almost frivolous. We reject it.

In Pearson I, the court of appeals referred favorably to an earlier
case that rejected the “paternalistic assumption” that recipients of an
allegedly misleading communication are “no more discriminating
312
than the audience for children’s television.” Whether speech is inherently misleading should not be judged by reference to the most
credulous listener who ever might be exposed to it. Other courts
have indicated that “the mere fact that someone is misled by a particular communication is not proof that the communication is inherent313
ly misleading.”
Some courts want to see evidence that listeners’ confusion was
caused by the speech that the government is seeking to ban, rather than by
some other source of information. In a case where the State of Ohio
alleged that a milk label was giving consumers the false impression
that it is safer to drink milk from cows not treated with artificial hor-

308
309

310
311

312
313

Id. at 655.
Id. at 656. Pearson I also involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the FDA’s illdefined “significant scientific agreement” standard, id. at 655, but the court of appeals
found that the FDA’s failure to define the standard violated the Administrative Procedure
Act, so it did not need to decide those constitutional issues, id. at 660.
Id. at 656 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977)).
Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted); see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman
(WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (“In asserting that any and all scientific
claims . . . are presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe.”).
Id. (citing Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1181 (D. Colo. 2001).
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mones, the state pointed to some allegedly confused customers to
314
support its allegation that the label was inherently misleading.
However, the court noted that one of these customers claimed that
she formed the impression that the milk was safer based on conversa315
tions with her oncologist, rather than by reading milk labels. The
fact that oncologists make inaccurate statements was no reason to ban
the labeling of milk.
Moreover, courts tend not to judge whether a claim is inherently
misleading under the worst-case assumptions that bioethicists some316
times employ when assessing risks. Courts’ non-alarmist approach
is exemplified by the case Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, which
held that it was not inherently misleading for a pesticide to claim that
317
The State of Colorado had asserted that
it was “safe for kids.”
“there is no realistic way to counter the misleading impression that
such pesticide is safe for all kids of all ages with whatever mental or
318
The court, however,
physical health problems they may have.”
found it implausible to believe that consumers reading the claim
would think it meant the product “safe for all kids of all ages and all
possible health problems or disabilities without any responsible adult su319
The court rejected the state’s worst-case (and hidden)
pervision.”
assumption that children purchase and use pesticides with no involvement of their parents.
In Pearson I, the “Court of Appeals strongly suggested, without declaring so explicitly, that [the unconfirmed health claim in question]
320
was only ‘potentially misleading,’ not ‘inherently misleading’” and
“that when ‘credible evidence’ supports a claim . . . that claim may
321
not be absolutely prohibited.” Pearson I suggests that when a claim
has considerable evidence to support it but the evidence is mixed or
unclear, the proper approach is to disclose the uncertainty rather
322
However, Pearson I does not rule
than ban the speech altogether.
out the possibility that a ban may be warranted if the evidence is so

314
315
316

317
318
319
320
321
322

Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 638−39.
See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS, at xi (2010) (reflecting on the use
of worst case scenarios and commenting that worst case scenarios are almost always counterproductive as planning exercises).
Bioganic, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
Id. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110 (D.D.C. 2001).
Id. at 114 (citing Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 659.
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heavily skewed against a claim that a disclaimer would not suffice.323
Pearson I envisioned that this might occur “where evidence in support
324
of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim.”
For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical
claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s
disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer
such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim”
325
would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness.

Note, however, that Pearson I did not envision banning speech in situations where evidence supporting a claim is weak but uncontradicted.
Pearson I left open the possibility of banning speech only when the evidence cuts both ways and the weight of the evidence disfavors the
326
claim.
A later case, Pearson II, challenged whether the FDA had appro327
The agency had banned a claim
priately applied this concept.
about the health effects of folic acid after stating that the claim was
328
against the weight of scientific evidence. Courts have “the authority
to examine and rule on any actions of a federal agency that allegedly
violate the Constitution,” and courts give little deference to a regula329
In contrast, courts
tor’s opinion about constitutional questions.
generally do give considerable “deference to an agency’s assessment
330
The
of scientific or technical data within its area of expertise.”
court in Pearson II was “mindful that it is generally not for the judicial
branch to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific
331
evidence,” but nevertheless proceeded to do so. The court concluded that “even a cursory examination of the scientific literature on
which the FDA relied in its Folic Acid Decision demonstrates that the
FDA’s conclusion that the ‘weight’ of the evidence was against plaintiff’s Folic Acid claim was arbitrary, capricious and otherwise in viola-

323
324
325
326
327
328
329

330
331

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 107 (D.D.C. 2001).
Id. at 115.
See, e.g., Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 n.10 (D.D.C.
2011) (quoting Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 59 n.20
(D.D.C. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Serono Labs Inc. v. Shalala,
158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Agency evaluations of scientific data within its area
of expertise, and hence is entitled to a high level of deference.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Alliance for Natural Health US, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
Pearson II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir.
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tion of law.”332 Those who wish to ban a scientific claim cannot simply
make conclusory statements that the weight of the evidence is against
the claim. The weight of the evidence really must be against it, and
in First Amendment cases, courts are prepared to depart from their
usual deferential posture in order to verify that this is so.
Are claims inherently misleading if current science can neither prove them
nor disprove them? The 2010 milk-labeling case, International Dairy
333
Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, pondered a question that is highly relevant to
the return of results: Are claims inherently misleading when the
technology to confirm that they are true simply does not yet exist? In
that case, an Ohio regulation refused to let farmers label their milk
“rbST free” in situations where the farmers had avoided treating their
334
cows with the artificial hormone rbST to stimulate milk production.
The state alleged—and a lower court had agreed—that such claims
were inherently misleading because, using current testing technology, there is no detectable difference between milk produced by rbST335
Thus, the label created a misleading
free and rbST-treated cows.
impression that “rbST-free” milk was better than other milk, when no
real difference could be measured.
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
“the failure to discover rbST in [milk from treated cows] is not necessarily because the artificial hormone is absent in such milk, but rather
336
because scientists have been unable to perfect a test to detect it.”
Using present testing technology, the notion that milk from rbST-free
cows is safer than other milk was not provably true, but neither was it
provably false. If it was not provably false, then it was not “inherently
misleading” to leave consumers with the impression that it may be
337
Any misimpression could be addressed by requiring disclotrue.
sure that it simply is not presently known whether the milk is differ338
ent. Labeling milk “rbST-free” thus was not inherently misleading.
At oral argument, the state conceded that milk from treated cows
339
“could” contain rbST although no test has been able to verify this.
332
333
334
335
336
337

338
339

Id.
622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 637.
See id. (noting that the FDA, in a guidance document, seemed to contemplate that a
compositional difference may actually exist between the two types of milk and left open
the possibility that future technologies may be able to detect the presence of rbST in milk
from treated cows).
Id. at 639–40.
Id. at 637.
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That concession was fatal to the state’s argument: if something
“could” be true, it is hard to maintain that it is inherently misleading.
340
As already noted, the party wishing to restrict speech has the
burden to prove it is misleading. International Dairy Foods displays the
impact this has in situations where scientific evidence is inconclusive.
The court of appeals in International Dairy Foods remanded the case
back to the lower court for further proceedings, indicating that if the
state wanted to ban the speech as “inherently misleading,” the state
341
needed to produce evidence that the speech was false. “But there is
no evidence in the record to verify the State’s contention. In light of
this insufficiently developed factual record, the State has not shown
that it is entitled” to ban the “rbST-free” label as inherently mislead342
ing. When the available scientific evidence is inconclusive, it is difficult indeed for the government to prove a health claim false. The
court of appeals commented that “it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least
some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed deci343
Even if it is not yet known whether milk from “rbST-free”
sion.”
cows is better than milk from rbST-treated cows, consumers still may
benefit from the “incomplete” information that the cow whose milk
they are drinking was not treated with rbST. That fact is known, even
if its significance for the quality of milk products remains uncertain.
The problem of incomplete information obviously arises when returning genetic test results. There may be trustworthy information
that a person has a gene variant but considerable uncertainty about
that variant’s health or reproductive significance. Many bioethicists
agree that it is appropriate to suppress the return of results in this
344
This view presumes that the investigator who wishes to
situation.
return results has the burden of establishing that the findings have
the requisite levels of scientific certainty and meaning, before he or
she can speak. Yet, as International Dairy Foods makes clear, the burden of validation does not lie with the speaker for First Amendment
purposes. Instead, the burden of invalidation rests with those who
seek to declare the speech inherently misleading and suppress the return of results.

340
341
342
343
344

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
Boggs, 622 F.3d at 638.
Id.
Id. at 636 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374–75 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.C.
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In the face of genuine scientific uncertainty (as when a genephenotype association is not clearly established as valid but also is not
provably invalid), the government has the burden to show that the
claimed association is false or deceptive before it can suppress
speech. If there is some evidence to support the association but the
association remains subject to uncertainty, the Pearson cases and International Dairy Foods v. Boggs suggest it would not be constitutional to
ban the speech outright, although it may be perfectly appropriate to
require a disclosure that frankly admits how uncertain or even dubious the association actually is. If the available evidence simply cannot
confirm whether the claim is true or false, then the party who bears
the burden of proof will lose. The First Amendment rests that burden on those who would suppress speech rather than on the speaker.
Who has the burden of validating or invalidating health claims? The
cautious bioethical view treats the speaker as bearing the burden of
validation in situations where scientific evidence is inconclusive. That
approach would not satisfy a court in a First Amendment challenge to
a law or regulation that restricts the return of results. Because this
point is so critical in the present bioethical debate, it bears repeating
for emphasis: as Pearson II points out, “even if [a claim] is in some respects ‘potentially misleading,’ the resulting injury that could flow to
consumers cannot compare, as a matter of law, with the First
Amendment injury” that comes from unwarranted suppression of
345
The government “may not place an absolute prohibition
speech.
on . . . potentially misleading information . . . if the information also
346
may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.”
Pearson I “clearly ruled that the FDA may not prohibit a health
claim unless it first makes a ‘showing’ that the claim’s alleged ‘misleadingness’ could not be cured through the use of a disclaimer or
347
other types of disclosure.” Subsequent cases have debated just how
348
much actual evidence this “showing” requires. In Pearson I, the FDA

345
346
347
348

Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 119 (D.D.C. 2001).
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
Pearson II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (discussing Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 658).
See Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 62 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that the court in Whitaker v. Thompson arguably went even further than Pearson I by
suggesting that the government must provide empirical evidence proving that the public
would still be deceived even if the claim was qualified by a disclaimer) (referencing Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002)). But see Alliance for Natural
Health US v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2011) (“This Court agrees that Pearson I does not require the FDA to make an empirical showing of the inefficacy of a disclaimer before prohibiting a claim that is not supported by credible evidence.”).
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asserted that adding disclaimers to uncertain health claims would
349
confuse consumers, but “all the government offer[ed] in support
[was] the FDA’s pronouncement that ‘consumers would be considerably confused by a multitude of claims with differing degrees of relia350
This unsupported assertion was not sufficient to justify a
bility.’”
speech ban. Anyone seeking to ban the return of uncertain or poorly
substantiated results should be aware that courts expect real evidence
of why a disclosure would not work. Courts continue to debate pre351
cisely how much evidence is required, but merely alleging that “participants will be confused” is clearly not enough.
Many scholars in the fields of bioethics and medicine call for evidence-based medicine, but do not see a corresponding need for evidence-based policies and evidence-based regulations. Many recommendations to suppress the return of research results rest on little
more than conjectures and suppositions. Holm and Taylor note that
return of “genomic research results has historically been opposed, by
some, based on an assumption that therapeutic misconceptions are
inevitable, that harm necessarily flows from a misconception and is
unpreventable and incurable, and that such harm necessarily outweighs any potential benefit, regardless of how benefit might be con352
ceived or measured.” In other words, bioethicists at times seem to
presume that research participants are, to use Pearson I’s words, “no
353
more discriminating than the audience for children’s television.” If
the recommended speech restrictions were implemented into law,
those laws would face First Amendment challenges, and courts in
those challenges would expect proponents of speech restrictions to
present real evidence to support these conjectures, suppositions, and
assumptions. As the Supreme Court stated in Central Hudson, “condi354
tional and remote eventualities cannot justify silencing” speech.
The First Amendment requires proponents of speech restrictions to
show that the proposed restrictions are evidence-based regulations.
Little in the literature on return of results suggests the bioethics
community would be able to do so.

349
350
351
352

353
354

Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 659.
Id. (quoting the FDA’s pronouncement at 59 Fed. Reg. at 6279).
See supra note 348 (listing cases that have debated this point).
Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 670; see also Kohane & Taylor, supra note 112, at 1–2
(“[P]roviding results would both depend on and foster the misconception that clinical
research is about clinical care (referred to here as therapeutic misconception).”).
Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 655 (quoting Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n,
496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980).
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Conclusion: Return of results is eligible for constitutional protection. The
return of results is neither “speech related to unlawful activity” nor is
it “inherently misleading.” It is therefore eligible for First Amendment protection as commercial speech. After Step One of Central
Hudson analysis, the focus shifts away from the speech that is being
regulated and toward the regulation itself. Regulations restricting
355
lawful, non-misleading speech must satisfy three constraints: the
government’s asserted interest in regulating the speech must be sub356
357
stantial; the regulation must directly advance that interest; and
the restriction on speech must be no more extensive than neces358
sary. A law or regulation must satisfy all three of these conditions
and is unconstitutional if it fails any one of these criteria.
C. Does the Government Have a Substantial Interest in Suppressing the
Return of Results?
Because Steps Two–Four of the Central Hudson test are regulationspecific, a separate analysis is necessary for each law or regulation that
is facing a First Amendment challenge. For example, a state law that
restricts the return of results would need to be analyzed separately
from restrictions imposed under CLIA’s research exception. Fortunately, case law reveals several common principles that have general
relevance when determining, at Step Two of Central Hudson analysis,
whether the government has a substantial interest in suppressing
speech.
The government’s “asserted interest in regulating speech” refers
to the objective the government claims it is trying to achieve by imposing speech restrictions. To ascertain the government’s interest,
courts consider statements the government made when it imposed
the speech restrictions as well as explanations the government offers
at the time of the First Amendment challenge. Courts tend to be fairly deferential to the government’s assessment that a particular interest is substantial. It is not uncommon to see a court simply assume
after cursory analysis that the government’s stated interest is substantial and then move on to Steps Three and Four of Central Hudson
359
analysis. The government often is able to slip through Step Two by
355
356
357
358
359

See discussion supra Part III.B.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 655–66 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that
the FDA’s asserted interests were protection of public health and prevention of consumer
fraud and noting that, at this level of generality, therefore, a substantial governmental in-
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asserting a general interest in “ensuring the accuracy of commercial
360
information in the marketplace” or in “promoting the health, safe361
ty, and welfare of its citizens.” Occasionally, however, courts do find
fault with the government’s asserted interest and conclude that a
speech regulation is unconstitutional at Step Two. Cases where this
has happened demonstrate three points that are relevant to the return of results.
The government’s interest in keeping the public from being misled. The
first point is that the government’s interest in protecting the public
from being misled does not justify banning health claims that are uncertain but not provably false. Some courts reach this conclusion at
Step Two of Central Hudson analysis; they reject the notion that the
government has a substantial interest in shielding people from
362
In the International Dairy
speech that is scientifically uncertain.
Foods and Bioganic cases discussed earlier, the only asserted govern363
mental interests were to protect the public from being misled. In
International Dairy Foods, the milk processors who were challenging
the state’s labeling regulations were willing to concede that the state
had a substantial interest in preventing consumer deception. The
court was less willing to concede this and insisted that “the State bears
364
the burden to demonstrate that the harms it recites are real.” This
was difficult for the state to do because the court had just concluded,
in Step One of the Central Hudson analysis, that the milk labels in
question were not inherently misleading. In light of that finding, the
state’s proof fell short of establishing the substantial interest required
365
at Step Two.
366
In Bioganic, the court chided the state for “misapprehend[ing]
367
the analysis prescribed by Central Hudson.” The court pointed out

360
361
362

363

364
365
366

terest is undeniable, and that the more significant questions under Central Hudson are the
next two factors).
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993).
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995).
Other courts address the issue at Steps Three and Four of Central Hudson analysis, rejecting a speech ban as too drastic a response when disclosure would alert listeners to the scientific uncertainty.
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the
purpose of the challenged milk-labeling state regulation was to prevent the use of false
and misleading labeling); Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d, 1168,
1182 (D. Colo. 2001) (“According to Defendant, Colorado has a substantial interest in
protecting the public from claims that pesticides are ‘safe,’ which by their very nature are
inherently misleading.” (citation omitted)).
Boggs, 622 F.3d at 638 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S.
136, 146 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 639.
174 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
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that if the claims were inherently misleading, the Central Hudson analysis would have ended at Step One. The fact that the analysis had
proceeded to Step Two implied that the claims were not inherently
368
Therefore, the state could not maintain it had a submisleading.
stantial interest in protecting the public from inherently misleading
claims. In Bioganic, the state’s speech ban was found unconstitutional
after Step Two of the analysis because the state had failed to identify a
369
substantial interest that the speech ban would serve.
Based on these decisions, the government does not have a substantial interest in banning the return of results that are uncertain or
that lack an established clinical or reproductive significance. As explained in Part IV.C supra, such results are not inherently misleading
in a legal sense of the word. To ban the return of such results, the
government needs to do more than merely assert an interest in keep370
Even if speech “coming research subjects from being misled.
municates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First
Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than
371
no information at all.” The government does not have a substantial
interest in shielding people from the reality that some scientific findings are uncertain at the time they are communicated.
372
The Supreme Court confirmed this in Western States, the 2002
case that challenged the FDA’s ban on advertising by compounding
pharmacies. The agency, perhaps familiar with the previous year’s
decision in Bioganic, did not assert a substantial interest in keeping
consumers from being misled. However, a dissenting justice voiced
concerns about the “systematic effect . . . of [communications] that
will not fully explain the complicated risks at issue” and worried that
patients who see such advertisements “will be confused about the
373
Because the dissent had raised this issue, the Court
drug’s risks.”
proceeded to analyze it. If the government had an interest in protecting vulnerable listeners, “this interest could be satisfied by the far
less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be
labeled with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing
367
368
369
370

371
372
373

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9
(1980) (“[I]n recent years th[e Supreme] Court has not approved a blanket ban on
commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because it
was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.”).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977)).
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Id. at 376.
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and that its risks were unknown.”374 The Court noted that “the choice
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the [legislature’s]. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
375
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”
When returning research results that are subject to uncertainty,
the First Amendment makes a choice: disclose the uncertainties rather than ban the speech. “[I]n recent years, [the Supreme] Court
has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because it was deceptive
376
or related to unlawful activity.” A test result that is uncertain, but
frankly disclosed as such can hardly be viewed as “deceptive.”
Governmental interests that are inconsistently pursued. A second relevant point is that it is hard for the government to claim that an interest is “substantial” when the government has a history of pursuing the
interest in an inconsistent manner. This point is illustrated in Sorrell
v. IMS Health, the recent case that challenged a Vermont statute restricting data-mining companies’ ability to disseminate prescriber377
identifying pharmacy records for use in drug marketing. The State
of Vermont asserted that one of its objectives was to protect the con378
fidentiality of physicians’ prescribing records. The Supreme Court
was willing to assume that physicians do have an interest in keeping
379
However, the state’s astheir prescribing decisions confidential.
serted interest in protecting physician’s privacy was belied by the fact
that the statute let pharmacies “share prescriber-identifying information with anyone for any reason save one: They must not allow the
information to be used for marketing” by pharmaceutical compa380
nies. It was hard to maintain that the law promoted physician privacy when the law allowed wide dissemination of their data to all except one disfavored class of recipients: drug manufacturers. If the
state’s interest really was substantial, why was the state pursuing that
interest so haphazardly?
As the Court noted in a 1999 case, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
381
382
Ass’n v. United States, it is “by no means self-evident” that a gov374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381

Id. at 376.
Id. at 375 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
Id. at 2668.
Id.
Id.
527 U.S. 173 (1999).
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ernmental interest is substantial when the government’s policies on
383
the matter are “decidedly equivocal.” In Sorrell, Vermont’s failure to
384
adopt “a more coherent policy” for protecting physician’s confidentiality implied that the state’s “asserted interest in physician confiden385
tiality does not justify the burden” its law placed on protected
speech.
This second point has enormous significance for return of results.
Many bioethicists recommend suppressing the return of results that
386
lack well-established clinical validity and clinical utility. Before giving these recommendations the force of law, the government would
need to enunciate a substantial interest that is served by restricting
the communication of research results that lack clinical validity and
utility. That would be hard for the government to do, because the existing CLIA regulations routinely allow CLIA-certified laboratories to
offer lab-developed tests (“LDTs”) for use in clinical care without re387
quiring proof that the tests have clinical validity or utility. Restricting the return of research results that lack clinical validity or utility
would, in effect, hold experimental tests to a higher standard than
CLIA requires of commercially available tests used in clinical care.
The government’s policy incoherence undercuts the assertion that it
has a substantial interest in banning the return of research results
that lack a well-established clinical validity and utility.
If the government really did have a substantial interest in suppressing communication of test results that lack established clinical
validity and utility, then the government not only would ban the return of research results that fit this description but also would amend
the CLIA regulation to require LDTs to pass through a data-driven
review of clinical validity and utility before they can be used in clinical
care. For more than fifteen years, the government has persistently
388
After
ignored bioethicists’ pleas to subject LDTs to such review.
382
383
384
385
386
387

388

Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (quoting Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 195) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2668.
See discussion supra Part II.
See TASK FORCE OF GENETIC TESTING, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH-DEP’T OF ENERGY WORKING
GRP. ON ETHICAL, LEGAL & SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH,
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (Neil A.
Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds., 1997), http://www.genome.gov/10002404 [hereinafter NIH-DOE Report] (discussing the problem of CLIA-regulated lab-developed tests);
see also SACGT, 2000 REPORT, supra note 38; SACGHS, 2008 REPORT, supra note 80.
See NIH-DOE Report, supra note 387, at ch. 2 (recommending in 1997 that all genetic
tests, including CLIA-regulated LDTs, should pass through a data-driven review of safety
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Sorrell and Greater New Orleans, it would be difficult for the government to maintain that it has a substantial interest in banning return
of results that lack clinical validity and utility, when CLIA presently
allows a vast commerce in such results for use in clinical care.
Policy incoherence also may exist in connection with CLIA’s regulation of analytical claims (claims of analytical validity) as well as clinical claims (claims that a test has clinical validity and/or utility). The
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society
(“SACGHS”) notes that making valid analytical measurements involves several important aspects, one of which is quality control and
389
quality assurance (“QC” and “QA”) procedures. CLIA requires labs
to have QA programs, and a key component of these programs is pro390
ficiency testing (“PT”). PT is viewed as “the most rigorous form of
391
performance assessment” and, when Congress authorized the CLIA
program in 1988, “Congress wanted PT to ‘be the central element of
392
Unfortunately,
determining a laboratory’s competence.’”
SACGHS’s 2008 report found that CMS-approved PT programs were
available for “only 83 specific analytes, none of which are genetic tests
393
per se.” Although, in principle, all genetic tests should undergo PT,
SACGHS recognized that “such a goal cannot be achieved immedi394
ately” because of various constraints including shortages of wellcharacterized reference materials for labs to use in PT and internal
395
quality assurance activities. Such problems may be especially acute
when dealing with new or novel genetic tests, such as those that are
the subject of requests for return of results. In light of the various
constraints SACGHS noted, it is a challenge for the CLIA program
even to ensure that clinically available genetic tests have analytical validity. This again raises the question of whether calls to restrict the
return of results may be holding experimental genetic tests to a higher standard than is required for tests presently used in clinical care.

389
390
391
392
393
394
395

and effectiveness before the tests become routinely available in clinical care and after
they undergo significant modifications); SACGT, 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at x, 15–20
(calling in the year 2000 for all genetic tests, including LDTs, to undergo data-driven reviews focusing on the analytical and clinical validity as well as on any claims the developer
plans to make about a test’s clinical utility).
SACGHS, 2008 REPORT, supra note 80, at 67.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 73 (describing H.R. 100-899’s legislative history).
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 82–83.
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The government’s interest in keeping people from being upset. A third
relevant point is that the government does not have a substantial interest in keeping people from hearing factual statements that may
make them anxious. Learning unpleasant facts sometimes upsets
people but this is no reason for the government to suppress nonmisleading speech. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the State of Vermont
claimed that it had a substantial interest in regulating pharmaceutical
companies’ detailing operations because such operations may make
396
The state reasoned that patients would worry
patients “anxious.”
that their doctors were prescribing drugs in response to drug companies’ marketing efforts, instead of choosing the drug that actually is
best for the patient. The Supreme Court rejected this rationale:
“Speech remains protected even when it may ‘stir people to action,’
397
‘move them to tears,’ or ‘inflict great pain.’” The government can
and does regulate speech in situations where speakers deliberately
aim to upset people, for example, if a speaker makes threats or speaks
398
However, comwith the intention of inflicting emotional distress.
mercial speech almost never has the deliberate aim of threatening or
upsetting people; its aim is to convey information. Even if factual information may have the incidental effect of upsetting people, this is
no reason to suppress it. Facts are friendly for purposes of the First
Amendment. This is all the more true in light of recent survey data
that seems to show that returning results does not actually make par399
ticipants as anxious as previously was presumed.
Conclusion: Common rationales for restricting return of results do not sat400
isfy constitutional requirements. Table 1 listed various justifications
that bioethicists offer for suppressing the return of results. The first
four items in that table appear unlikely to withstand the second step
of Central Hudson analysis. Those justifications were that (1) individual findings are not reliable information that is worth communicating; (2) returning results is not effective because it may fail to motivate recipients to take steps to improve their health; (3) returning
results may cause participants to feel anxious; and (4) participants
may misunderstand their results. As just discussed, the government
396
397
398
399

400

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 195, at 492 (discussing the government’s ability to regulate
tortious or threatening speech).
See Terry, supra note 112, at 713 (“In recent years, some studies suggest that there is less
anxiety over receiving results than previously thought, though most studies were based on
cohorts that availed themselves of [genetic] counseling.”).
See supra pp. 580–82.
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does not have a substantial interest in suppressing the communication of low-value information, so long as the information is not inherently misleading. If the government could ban low-value speech,
very little of what most of us say would survive. The government does
not have a substantial interest in preventing people from experiencing anxiety in response to unpleasant, uncertain, or incomplete facts.
The government does not have a substantial interest in keeping people from being misled by speech that is not inherently misleading.
The government’s interest in protecting people from being misled by
such speech may support disclosure requirements, but does not support banning the speech.
D. Are Regulations Restricting the Return of Results Properly Tailored to
Advance the Government’s Interests?
Speech restrictions often receive their toughest scrutiny at Steps
Three and Four of Central Hudson analysis. At this point, courts accept (or assume) that the government is seeking to advance a substantial interest. However, the mere fact that the state has a “laudable
concern . . . does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for
401
“If the Government can achieve its
restricting protected speech.”
interests in a manner that does not restrict commercial speech, or
402
that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.” The regulation must be “in proportion to that interest” and be “designed care403
fully to achieve the State’s goal.” Steps Three and Four of the Central Hudson test consider “whether the regulation directly advances
404
the governmental interest asserted” and whether the fit between the
government’s ends and its means “is not necessarily perfect, but rea405
sonable.” These two steps are closely related and are discussed together below.
Suppressing speech that potentially may have bad consequences. As noted
in Table 1, bioethicists seeking to suppress the return of results often
406
argue that such speech may lead to bad consequences. For example, returning results may cause research participants to make ill407
advised healthcare decisions that harm them; it may expose them to
401
402
403
404
405
406
407

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980).
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 358 (2002).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (discussing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564,
566).
See supra Table 1, items 5, 6, 8, 9, 10.
Id. at item 5.
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a risk of stigmatization or discrimination;408 it may cause them to over409
consume follow-up healthcare services; it may divert financial re410
sources from other worthy research projects; or it may cause participants to propagate inaccurate understandings of the genome as they
411
attempt to decipher it for themselves. These types of arguments are
perennial losers at Steps Three and Four of Central Hudson analysis.
As the Supreme Court stated in Central Hudson, “We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a non-speech-related policy. In those circumstances, a
ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying gov412
ernmental policy.”
One of the first modern commercial speech cases, Virginia State
413
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, rejected the
idea of banning speech to protect people from the consequences of
bad decisions they may make in response to the speech. In that case,
the state feared that if the public saw ads for low-price pharmacies,
people would “choose the low-cost, low-quality service and drive the
‘professional’ pharmacist out of business” and thus “destroy the
414
pharmacist-customer relationship.” If the state was concerned that
low-cost pharmacies were offering low-quality service, the proper response was to revoke their licenses rather than to restrict their
415
speech.
416
The following year, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the state asserted that restrictions on attorney advertising were necessary to protect the public from doing business with low-quality lawyers. The Supreme Court acidly retorted, “Restraints on advertising . . . are an
417
The state should reguineffective way of deterring shoddy work.”
late the lawyers, not their speech. By this reasoning, suppressing the
return of results is an ineffective way to protect research participants
from receiving ill-advised, harmful, shoddy follow-up care from the
larger U.S. healthcare system. Bioethicists’ eagerness to regulate
what laboratories and investigators say sometimes smacks of an un408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417

Id. at item 6.
Id. at item 8.
Id. at item 9.
Id. at item 10.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 769.
See id. at 768–69 (noting that the state had extensive power to regulate the quality of
pharmacy services).
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 378.
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willingness to get serious about regulating what doctors do to people.
If research participants seek unnecessary care based on something a
genetics researcher told them, then their physicians have a duty not
to provide that care. If doctors are doing so, then that is the problem
bioethicists should focus on, at least as far as the Supreme Court is
concerned.
Governmental attempts to use speech restrictions as a tool for advancing unrelated policy objectives also fail at Steps Three and Four
of Central Hudson analysis. In Central Hudson, the state of New York
had banned advertising by utility companies as a way to advance the
418
The court
state’s objective of promoting energy conservation.
acknowledged that the state has a substantial interest in energy con419
servation, but held that the advertising ban was not a proper way to
advance that interest. The advertising ban did have a “direct link” to
420
energy conservation, but it was more extensive than it needed to
421
be. It suppressed advertising of energy-efficient consumption prac422
tices as well as wasteful ones. The state could have advanced energy
conservation through less draconian measures such as requiring disclosures about the relative efficiency and expense of the utility ser423
vices being advertised or pre-screening ads to eliminate only those
424
Justice Blackmun’s concurring
ads that provably promoted waste.
opinion in Central Hudson railed against the dangers inherent in allowing governmental bodies to “suppress[] . . . commercial speech in
order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the avail425
He would have applied strict scrutiny to
ability of information.”
governmental attempts to “influence behavior by depriving citizens of
426
information.”

418
419
420
421
422

423
424

425
426

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id.; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002) (rejecting a
pharmacy advertising ban that was overbroad because, although it arguably protected patients who should not take compounded drugs, it also blocked useful speech to patients
who could benefit from such drugs).
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571.
Id. at 571 n.13 (arguing that such prescreening could pass constitutional muster if it included adequate procedural safeguards and citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24, as suggesting that traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to commercial speech).
Id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 577; see also id. at 578 (“No differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information.”).
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In Western States,427 the FDA claimed that ban on advertising by
compounding pharmacies was necessary to “preserv[e] the effectiveness and integrity of the [agency]’s new drug approval process and
the protection of the public health that it provides” while simultaneously “preserv[ing] the availability of compounded drugs for those
428
individual patients” who need them. The FDA reasoned that if all
compounded drugs were forced to go through the FDA approval
process, the drugs would become prohibitively costly for patients who
429
On the other hand, if the agency let pharmacy comneed them.
pounders advertise their products, this might become a pathway for
circumventing the FDA approval process for drugs aimed at a wider
market. The Court agreed that these interests were substantial. The
FDA’s proposed solution was to treat advertising as a trigger for re430
quiring FDA approval. Compounders could continue offering their
products without an FDA approval as long they did not advertise, but
if compounders wanted to advertise, they would need to go through
the agency’s regular drug-approval process.
The Court held that this policy violated the First Amendment. If
the agency’s goal was to avoid mass-marketing of compounded drugs,
there were more direct ways to accomplish that objective. For example, the agency could ban commercial-scale manufacturing by compounding pharmacies, or it could prohibit them from preparing a
compounded drug in advance of receiving a prescription, or it could
limit the overall volume of drugs that compounding pharmacies can
431
sell in interstate commerce. Speech restrictions were justified only
432
if the FDA could show that other approaches would not work. The
agency had provided no such evidence and thus it had not justified
433
resorting to speech restrictions.
The dissent in Western States worried that advertising of compounded drugs would create demand among patients who did not ac434
The FDA, apparently aware of past cases
tually need such drugs.
like Virginia Board, had not even attempted such an argument, but
the Court took the trouble to analyze the dissent’s concern and rejected it once again. In the Court’s view, the dissenters’ concern that
speech would create demand for unnecessary treatments “amounts to
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 371–72.
Id. at 373 (discussing Justice Breyer’s dissent).
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a fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful infor435
mation about compounded drugs.” The Court noted that this fear
rests on the questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe
unnecessary treatments simply because misguided patients asked for
436
them. Even if that assumption were true, it still would not justify a
437
ban on advertising:
[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually
rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth . . . . The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what
438
the government perceives to be their own good.

If the goal was to prevent inappropriate prescribing of compounded
drugs, a proper solution might have been to regulate physicians’ bad
prescribing practices rather than to ban speech. Before it could ban
speech, the FDA needed to show “why it would not also be appropriate to rely on doctors to refrain from prescribing compounded drugs
to patients who do not need them in a world where advertising was
439
permitted.”
Very recently, Vermont attempted a speech-has-bad-consequences
argument in Sorrell v. IMS Health and (not surprisingly) the Supreme
Court rejected it. The state argued that pharmaceutical detailing
raises the costs of medical services by encouraging prescription of
440
The Court acknowledged that the
high-cost, on-patent drugs.
state’s policy goals may be proper but its regulation did not advance
441
The state was attempting to reduce
them in a proper way.
healthcare costs through the indirect means of restraining certain
442
speech by certain speakers. The Court reiterated, “Those who seek
to censor or burden free expression often assert that disfavored
speech has adverse effects. But the fear that people would make bad
decisions if given truthful information cannot justify content-based
443
burdens on speech.”
Addressing concerns about mix-ups. Of all the concerns that surround the return of results, perhaps the most substantial one is the
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443

Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 375.
Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 376.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct 2653, 2670 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2670–71 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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risk of potential mix-ups in which one person would receive another
person’s test results. When research procedures call for specimens to
be used in de-identified form, there is little potential for such mix-ups
to occur because de-identification renders it impossible to return results. The potential for mix-ups arises, however, if a research laboratory uses specimens in an identifiable form (coded or fully identified)
yet fails to maintain appropriate controls to ensure that specimens
and test results consistently and reliably can be traced back to the
identities of the specimen contributors. Because CLIA requires record-keeping and sample-control procedures, requiring CLIA certification of labs that return results obviously could help reduce the
chance of mix-ups. Yet, even if the government may have a substantial interest in averting mix-ups, and even if the CLIA regulation directly advances that interest, requiring CLIA certification is not the
least restrictive means to advance the government’s interest. CLIAcertified laboratories are subject to many requirements that go far
beyond what is necessary to avoid mix-ups. CLIA requires labs to undergo periodic inspections (known as surveys) every two years to assess compliance with an wide array of requirements addressing things
like the qualifications of lab personnel; CLIA also requires quality
control standards, proficiency testing, and quality assurance that go
considerably beyond simply keeping good records and maintaining
444
A less restrictive way to avoid
reliable sample-control procedures.
mix-ups would be simply to require appropriate record-keeping and
sample-control procedures, without requiring all the other things
that CLIA requires. The notion that CLIA-certification is necessary in
order to avoid mix-ups in the return of results fails at the final step of
Central Hudson analysis: it is not the least restrictive means to get the
job done.
Conclusion: Recommended polices to suppress the return of results are
more restrictive than the Constitution allows. Even if it is true that return
of results may have bad consequences, this does not justify banning
the return of results. Table 3 summarizes the constitutional status of
the various bioethical justifications offered in Table 1.

444

See SACGHS, 2008 REPORT, supra note 80, at 64 (briefly summarizing CLIA regulatory
requirements).

624

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

TABLE 3
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF BIOETHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
RESTRICTING THE RETURN OF RESULTS
CHALLENGES TO THE VALUE OF THE COMMUNICATION
1. Individual findings are not “information” worth communicating. These arguments appear likely to fail at Step Two of Central Hudson analysis (no
substantial governmental interest in suppressing low-worth communications that are not inherently misleading). Policies to suppress the return of results that lack well-established clinical validity and utility appear particularly likely to fail at Step Two of the analysis. Concerns
about analytical validity may also be subject to challenge at Step Two
but, if they survive Step Two, appear likely to fail at Steps Three–Four on
the basis that suppressing speech is not the least restrictive means to address uncertainty about the value of the information being returned.
2. Returning results is ineffective: even if participants are not harmed by it, they
may fail to gain any benefits. Such arguments fail at Step Two (no substantial governmental interest in suppressing low-worth communications that
are not inherently misleading).
CONCERNS ABOUT LISTENER VULNERABILITY
3. Returning results may expose participants to anxiety. This argument fails at
Step Two (no substantial governmental interest in preventing people
from feeling anxiety in response to unpleasant factual statements).
4. Participants may misunderstand their results. Some courts reject this justification at Step Two; other courts reject it at Steps Three–Four. The government cannot ban speech that is not inherently misleading. However,
the government may be justified in requiring disclosure of the uncertainty and limited clinical validity and utility of experimental genetic test results. Another appropriate speech-preserving response would be for the
government to ensure adequate services are available to help people understand their test results.
5. Returning results may cause participants to make bad healthcare decisions that
harm them. This argument fails at Steps Three–Four. The proper response is not to suppress speech but instead to regulate physicians and
healthcare organizations to deter provision of unneeded and harmful
health care.
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6. Returning results exposes participants to the risk of stigmatization or discrimination. This concern fails at Steps Three–Four. Proper response is not to
suppress communication of genetic test results but instead to pass laws
such as the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act to tackle stigmatization and discrimination directly.
7. Participants’ preferences to receive return of results may not reflect what they actually want. This has not been litigated. First Amendment doctrine accepts
that listeners are the best parties to assess their own desire to partake of
communication, and First Amendment law generally does not secondguess them. The exception would be if the listener meets criteria for decisional incompetence under the law of the state where the communication takes place—a standard that few people who have been permitted to
participate in genetic research would meet.
CONCERNS ABOUT BROADER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HARMS TO THE PUBLIC
8. Returning results may cause participants to over-consume follow-up healthcare
services. Arguments that “speech has bad consequences” generally fail at
Steps Three–Four. The proper response is not to suppress speech but to
regulate physicians and healthcare organizations to deter provision of
wasteful healthcare services.
9. The cost of returning results may harm the research enterprise. This is another
“speech has bad consequences” argument that would fail at Steps Three–
Four. Suppressing speech is neither a direct nor least-restrictive way to
address the national challenge of financing biomedical research. Moreover, the alleged high cost of returning results often reflects bioethicists’
assumption that researchers must fully validate research results before
they return them. Returning less-fully validated results with appropriate
disclosure of the uncertainties would address the cost problem effectively
without burdening free speech.
10. Participants may corrupt genetic understanding as they attempt to decipher the
meaning of their test results. This argument implicates core First Amendment speech. It fails not as an intrusion on commercial speech, but as
an intrusion on core First Amendment speech.

E. Is the Return of Results Regulable as Professional Speech?
It is sometimes hard to draw a clean line between commercial
speech and other forms of speech that the government is free to reg-
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ulate.445 One category of regulable speech—professional speech—
requires further discussion.
Reasons for regulating professional speech. Governmental bodies have
considerable latitude to regulate the “professional speech” that physicians, lawyers, and other licensed professionals communicate to their
446
patients and clients in the course of professional practice activities.
This does not, however, imply that all “speech by a professional” can
constitutionally be regulated; the “difference between professional
447
speech and speech by a professional is constitutionally profound.”
To illustrate this point, Professor Post cites a case in which a state licensing board was able to discipline a dentist for advising his patients
that amalgam fillings were poisonous—advice that, in the board’s
448
However, the
view, was against the weight of scientific evidence.
board had to back off in the face of a First Amendment suit when it
subsequently tried to discipline the dentist for publishing that same
449
The in-office advice to patients
message in a newspaper editorial.
was regulable “professional speech” that could be sanctioned if it violated accepted professional standards. The same advice published in
450
a newspaper editorial was pure “speech by a professional” that merited the highest level of constitutional protection. Thus, the precise
parameters and context of a communication affect how much First
Amendment protection it receives.
The regulation of professional speech is justified, at least in part,
by concerns about listener vulnerability. The settings in which laypeople meet with professionals may serve to make the listener vulnerable—for example, seeking treatment for an illness, seeking accounting advice about a stressful tax audit, or consulting a lawyer because
one is in jail or is being sued. Moreover, it can be hard for a client or
patient to evaluate claims made by licensed professionals who possess
445

446

447

448
449
450

See Post, supra note 200, at 21 (noting the large number of cases in which the Supreme
Court has addressed the distinction between commercial speech and fully protected public discourse but a relative paucity of cases in which the Court has clarified the distinction
between protected commercial speech and other forms of commercial communication
that fall outside of First Amendment protection and can be regulated).
See Halberstam, supra note 59, at 834–38 (discussing the scope of governmental authority
to regulate physicians’ speech); see also Post, supra note 56, at 947–49 (discussing regulation of professional speech by physicians and dentists).
Post, supra note 56, at 949; see also Halberstam, supra note 59, at 843 (distinguishing
speech “uttered in the course of professional practice” from speech “uttered by a professional”).
Breiner v. State, No. CV 98061275, 1998 WL 738066, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 7,
1998).
Post, supra note 56, at 948–49.
Id.
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superior knowledge in their fields. Thus, a licensing body or other
qualified group of professionals intervenes and defines the boundaries of what licensed professionals may say.
Problems with the view that return of results is practice of medicine. Regulating the return of results might be justified, from a legal point of
view, if returning results were conceived as a form of professional
speech. The idea here is that returning results converts the research
encounter into a clinical encounter, transforming research participants into patients and thrusting investigators into the practice of
medicine. The line between research and medical practice is in fact a
blurry one that grows ever blurrier in the context of modern genomic
451
medicine. Yet, there are conceptual problems in equating return of
results with the practice of medicine and then citing this as the rationale for regulating investigators’ speech.
One contradiction is that, under this theory, the return of results
seemingly should be most heavily regulated in situations where results
have high clinical or reproductive significance and actionability, and
least regulated when the results are uncertain or lack clinical significance. When investigators return clinically significant, actionable results, the analogy between returning results and practicing medicine
is at its zenith and the case for regulating the communication as
“practice of medicine” is strongest. When the results have little or no
clinical significance (and assuming this fact has been properly disclosed), the participant is less like a patient and the communication
bears little similarity to medical practice. This implies that regulating
the return of results is most justified when the results have high clinical significance and least justified when they do not.
Yet, this is directly at odds with the policies many bioethicists recommend. As discussed earlier, a number of bioethical studies recommend not returning results that lack clinical utility or actionabil452
453
ity or that have uncertain medical or reproductive significance.
Under a professional speech analysis, speech regulation is least justified in such circumstances. Discussing genes that have no current
451

452
453

See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 37, at 444–45 (noting that return of results forces a rethinking of
the traditional wall between research and clinical care); see also Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 476–85 (2010) (discussing 2007 amendments to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act that envision ongoing research activities after drugs have made
the transition into clinical care).
See Wolf et al, supra note 42, at 230–31 tbl.3 (summarizing recommendations from various
bioethical studies of the return of individual research results).
Parker, supra note 20, at 452 (“It is generally, though not uniformly, agreed that unreliable results ought not be offered back to individuals.”).
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medical significance is not the practice of medicine; it is more in the
nature of a chat about the poorly developed state of genetic science:
“You have this gene variant, and nobody really knows whether it affects human health.” Such remarks are better characterized as
“speech by a professional” (assuming, of course, that the investigator
454
even is a licensed medical professional) than “professional speech.”
Banning the return of results that lack clinical validity or utility cannot be justified as regulation of professional speech because such
speech bears little resemblance to the practice of medicine.
Second, it would be odd indeed for the federal government to defend its various restrictions on the return of results under the theory
that these are valid regulations of the practice of medicine. These re455
456
strictions arise under the CLIA regulation and the Common Rule,
both regulations administered by agencies within HHS. In other
HHS regulatory contexts, such as FDA regulation of medical products, the federal government has scrupulously sought to avoid intrud457
ing on the states’ prerogative to regulate the practice of medicine.
There is little real doubt that the federal government could regulate
458
aspects of medical practice if it desired to do so, but as a policy matter the FDA has gone to great lengths not to regulate the practice of
medicine during the seventy-five years it has been regulating under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. In light of that history, it
seems almost inconceivable that HHS would assert that its restrictions

454
455

456
457

458

Post, supra note 56, at 949.
See discussion supra Part I.C (concerning restrictions applicable to CLIA-certified laboratories); see also discussion supra Part I.D (concerning restrictions on return of results by
non-CLIA-certified labs under the CLIA research exception at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2)).
See discussion supra Part I.E (concerning restrictions under the Common Rule at 45
C.F.R. pt. 46).
See, e.g., Evans, supra note 451, at 500–02, 521–23 (tracing Congress’s careful avoidance,
in the years between 1930 and the present, of federal intrusions into the practice of medicine in connection with federal regulation of medical products); see also David G. Adams,
The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Health Care Professionals, in 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATIONS: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC
PRODUCTS 423 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 1997) (“[T]he FDA has traditionally taken the
position that it does not regulate the practice of medicine or pharmacy and has generally
avoided regulatory actions that would directly restrict or interfere with professional service to patients.”).
See Adams, supra note 457, at 424–25 (noting that courts have never found constitutional
limits on the FDA’s power to regulate physicians); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA
Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. art. 5, at 7 (2006) (arguing that there is little doubt under modern law
that Congress has ample power to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and use of
drugs and medical devices and this reasoning encompasses genetic tests insofar as genetic
tests are a form of medical device).
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on the return of results are a valid federal regulation of medical
speech.
There is a third contradiction in the view that return of results in459
volves the type of “dependence or reliance” that justifies regulation
of professional speech. At the point when participants consent to
participate in research, the Common Rule conceives them to be autonomous and capable of making decisions in their own best interests. If this were not true at the point when they consented, then it
may have been unethical to allow them to participate in the research
or, at least, it may have been appropriate to constrain their ability to
consent as is done for various categories of vulnerable individuals
460
under the regulations at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpts. B–D. Thus it can
reasonably be presumed that any person who has been allowed to
participate in genetics research possesses the attributes of individual
autonomy. Yet later, at the point when research participants request
return of results, many bioethicists advocate restricting what they can
be told. As Professor Post points out, the urge to suppress consensual
communications often presumes that the participants are vulnerable
461
and incapable of acting in their own best interests. Yet, if they are
too vulnerable to make autonomous decisions about the return of results from the research, then was it ethical to involve them in the research at all?
It is of course true that vulnerability is context-dependent, and a
person may be autonomous in one situation while vulnerable in another. Consenting to participate in a study of genes associated with
susceptibility to cancer may be different from consenting to be told
that one may actually possess such a gene. Yet, bioethicists trace a
dubious line when they deem participants sufficiently autonomous to
consent to research yet insufficiently autonomous to consent to return of results from that same research. If, in fact, the participants
are incapable of appreciating the meaning, limitations, and uncertainty of the genetic tests used in the research, at the very least this
casts doubt on whether they were adequately informed about the nature of the research to which they so recently consented. This is the
inherent contradiction in policies that suppress the return of results
to research participants for their own good: such policies presume
that the participants have made a transition from autonomy to vul459
460

461

Post, supra note 200, at 23.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–46.409 (imposing special constraints on the informed content
process when the prospective research participants are children, pregnant women, or
prisoners).
Post, supra note 200, at 23.
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nerability which, if true, begs the question whether their continued
participation in the research is ethically appropriate. If the participants truly are confused about how uncertain experimental genetic
tests actually are, then their consent to the research may have been
tainted by misperceptions of its scientific value.
This is not to deny that research participants may be vulnerable in
the context of conversations that return research results. However, to
justify restricting investigators’ speech, bioethicists would need to explain more precisely how and why the participants became vulnerable
and what this vulnerability implies for other aspects of research where
they were presumed to be autonomous.
Conclusion: Return of results is not regulable as professional speech. Arguing that restrictions on the return of results are justified as a regulation of professional speech raises more questions than it resolves.
An enduring concern in bioethics is that research participants may
labor under a therapeutic misconception that causes them to confuse
research with medical practice. Yet, when bioethicists attempt to justify regulating the return of results because of its alleged similarity to
professional speech, it is the bioethicists rather than the research participants who fall prey to the therapeutic misconception. Return of
results is not the practice of medicine despite some overlap of the
topics discussed. HHS agencies that restrict the return of results
seem poorly positioned to assert otherwise. If HHS truly believed
that returning results amounts to the practice of medicine, its traditional posture on federalism seemingly would require HHS agencies
to step aside and let state medical practice boards regulate this
speech.
V. SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH CLIA RESTRICTIONS ON THE RETURN OF
RESULTS
The CLIA regulation exemplifies the First Amendment problems
that arise in connection with suppression of genomic speech. As noted earlier, HHS already has initiated a rulemaking that will facilitate
direct reporting of test results from CLIA-certified clinical laborato462
ries that are subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. HHS based this ac463
tion on concern about patients’ rights while also noting that “the
advent of certain health reform concepts (for example, individual462
463

See discussion supra Part I.C (citing CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note
52, at 56, 717).
See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 52, at 56,714 (citing a need to increase direct patient access rights).
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ized medicine and an individual’s active involvement in his or her
own health care) would be best served by revisiting CLIA limitations
464
Even if this initiative
on the disclosure of laboratory test results.”
proceeds to a final rule, however, it will only improve access to genetic test results in situations where the test subject is dealing with an entity covered by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Moreover, this rulemaking
initiative does nothing to address the return of results from nonCLIA-certified research laboratories. The CLIA research exception at
42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) continues to be perceived as a major barrier
465
to the return of research results.
The CLIA research exception places regulatory burdens on research laboratories (by requiring them to seek CLIA certification) if
they “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the
466
health of individual patients.” Administrative law judges who work
with CLIA sometimes summarize this condition by saying that CLIA
certification is required if a lab “perform[s] clinical diagnostic tests
467
on human specimens.” Phrased this way, it seems clear that returning results should not give rise to an obligation for a research lab to
seek CLIA certification because, quite obviously, an experimental genetic test is not the same thing as a clinical diagnostic test.
Yet, in practice, this is not very clear. The research exception is so
vague that people of ordinary intelligence cannot assess which types
468
of speech it prohibits. In particular, the research community is unsure whether returning individual research results to participants may
469
Can an experimental
trigger CLIA’s certification requirements.
genetic test that has no known clinical validity and utility be considered a test for “diagnosis, prevention, treatment . . . or assessment of
health?” One would think not. Yet, CLIA regularly allows LDTs that
have poorly validated clinical validity and utility to be used in clinical
470
care, so the lack of clinical significance does not necessarily exclude
an experimental test from being “clinical.” At the other extreme,
suppose an experimental test does have clinical validity and utility.
471
Does this fact transform it into a “clinical diagnostic test[]” that, if
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471

Id. at 56,713.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2012).
See, e.g., In re Blanding Urgent Care Ctr. Lab. v. Health Care Fin. Admin., No. CR438,
1996 WL 600630, at *8 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Sept. 30, 1996).
See discussion supra Part I.D.
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
Blanding, 1996 WL 600630, at *8.
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reported to the research participant, triggers the need for CLIA certification? The most sensible answer to this question appears to be no.
The CLIA regulation has severed the concept of a clinical diagnostic
test from the concept of a test that has well-established clinical validity
and utility. The regulation does not condition the “clinical” status of
a test upon a scientific evidentiary standard that requires proof of
clinical validity and utility. If LDTs that lack clinical validity can be
472
sold as clinical diagnostic tests, the flipside seemingly should be that
experimental tests do not become clinical tests merely by token of
having clinical validity and utility. But, can an investigator be sure?
Whether returning a test result triggers CLIA’s certification requirements simply cannot be inferred from the scientific attributes of
the test. The regulation provides no guidance on other factors that
may bear on this determination—for example, the subjective intent
of the speaker, the listener’s actual use of the information, and so
473
forth. Given the vagueness of this regulation, scientific investigators
working in non-CLIA-certified research laboratories are understandably hesitant to return results, especially in light of the following:
Any person who intentionally violates any requirement [of the CLIA regulation] shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined under
title 18, or both, except that if the conviction is for a second or subsequent violation of such requirement such person shall be imprisoned for
474
not more than 3 years or fined in accordance with title 18, or both.

Perhaps it displays the advancement of our post-genomic civilization
that CLIA only threatens jail time for investigators who inappropriately let laypeople read the Book of Life, whereas Tyndale was put to
death. The possibility of criminal penalties for violating CLIA’s research exception amplifies the constitutional problem with its vagueness. The standard of clarity required in criminal statutes is far more
475
demanding than in statutes that only carry civil penalties. “It would
be unthinkable to incarcerate someone for violating a law which she
476
could not possibly understand.”

472
473
474

475

476

See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
Public Health Service Act § 353(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a(l) (2006); see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 493.1806(e)(1994) (“Under section 353(l) of the PHS Act, an individual who is convicted of intentionally violating any CLIA requirement may be imprisoned or fined.”).
See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)
(discussing the Court’s greater tolerance of vagueness in civil, as opposed to criminal,
statutes).
Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren (Lungren I), 809 F. Supp. 747, 761 (N.D. Cal., 1992)
(citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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Suppose an investigator spots a gene mutation that suggests that a
research participant needs to report to her doctor immediately for a
colonoscopy to address the risk of colon cancer. Unfortunately, the
genetic test was performed in a research laboratory that lacks CLIA
certification, and the investigator is worried it may violate CLIA’s research exception to disclose the test result to the research participant. CLIA confronts this investigator with the possibility—at least in
theory—of going to jail for sharing potentially life-saving information
with the research participant. It is true that criminal law recognizes a
privilege for people to violate criminal statutes when necessary to save
a third party from death or serious bodily injury. The investigator
seemingly would be entitled to claim this privilege as a defense. But,
is it constitutional for CLIA to place investigators in the position of
having to make such choices?
HHS cannot skirt this constitutional problem by arguing that the
agency does not, in practice, apply CLIA’s criminal penalties to investigators who return research results. The Supreme Court has made it
very clear that “[w]ell-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards
477
In a First Amendment
do not neutralize the vice of a vague law.”
challenge to a California statute that envisioned criminal penalties
for manufacturers who make inappropriate environmental claims
about their products, the state argued that its “traditional office poli478
cy” was to handle violations civilly rather than criminally. The court
479
retorted, “This will not do” and proceeded to rule that the statute’s
480
definition of the term “recyclable” was unconstitutionally vague. In
the same way, even if HHS has no plans to impose criminal penalties
for violation of CLIA’s vague research exception, this will not do;
there still is a constitutional problem.
Vague laws pose constitutional problems even when they carry no
threat of criminal prosecution. There is a general principle that laws
481
Vague laws leave individuals unsure
must be definite to be valid.
which activities are prohibited and leave regulators without explicit
482
“[W]hen a law
standards to guide consistent, fair enforcement.
regulates conduct protected by the First Amendment, the vagueness
477
478
479

480
481
482

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
Lungren I, 809 F. Supp. at 761 n.14.
Id.; see also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren (Lungren II), 44 F.3d 726, 728 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1994) (noting, in the appeal of Lungren I, that the state chose not to appeal the District Court’s ruling that the definition of “recyclable” was unconstitutionally vague).
Lungren I, 809 F. Supp. at 762.
GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 972 (2013) (discussing definiteness
or vagueness of laws, regulations, and orders).
Id.
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doctrine demands an even ‘greater degree of specificity than in other
483
contexts’” and laws can be set aside if they are too vague. Courts
traditionally apply this concept in a “watered down” manner when
484
the speech in question is only commercial speech. As the Supreme
Court mused in Central Hudson, commercial speech is a “hardy breed
of expression” driven by speakers’ economic self-interests and, as
485
such, it is “not particularly susceptible to being crushed.” Based on
this reasoning, courts often are willing to tolerate a bit more vagueness in laws that regulate commercial speech than they would tolerate
486
in laws that regulate pure speech.
Several factors suggest that courts would not be willing to tolerate
the level of vagueness apparent in CLIA’s research exception. Although the speech in question—return of results—may qualify as
commercial speech, it is not driven by the speaker’s economic selfinterests in the way that commercial speech usually is. Investigators
return results gratis and, indeed, they do so at a perceived risk of having their federal research grants suspended if an IRB decides their
speech was unethical (whatever that means). Economic self-interest
does not favor this speech; rather, it reinforces the pressure not to
speak. Return of results is not the “hardy breed of expression” for
which courts have been willing to apply a relaxed vagueness doctrine.
Moreover, the return of results includes some expressive (pure
speech) elements that may warrant stronger protection than mere
commercial speech. This Article deliberately blinded itself to those
expressive elements as a matter of rigorous study design, but they undeniably are present and may call for application of a less-relaxed
vagueness doctrine. Finally, the potential for criminal penalties under the CLIA regulation argues against a relaxed attitude about the
research exception’s vagueness.
The Supreme Court mandates that a “statute, of course, is to be
construed, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid raising

483
484
485

486

Lungren I, 809 F. Supp. at 759 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 6:12 (2013).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980)
(quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing why overbroad regulations are less threatening to commercial
speech than to pure speech).
See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 1 n.9 (1979) (“When dealing with restrictions on
commercial speech we frame our decisions narrowly, allowing modes of regulation . . . that might otherwise be impermissible within the realm of personal expression.”
(citation omitted)); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982) (articulating a relaxed vagueness test in a commercial speech context).
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doubts of its constitutionality.”487 There are, to say the very least,
doubts about whether it is constitutional for HHS to construe CLIA’s
research exception in a way that bans the return of individual results
488
CLIA’s research exception must therefore
from genetic research.
be construed in a way that removes these doubts. It appears likely
that courts would do so if the question were put before them. It is to
be hoped that HHS will take the initiative and fix this problem without putting investigators and research participants to the expense of
petitioning federal courts to order HHS to do so. If HHS fails to act,
then court challenges are in order. HHS should clarify that the CLIA
research exception does not ban the return of genetic test results to
research participants who have expressed the desire to learn their results. This is not merely an ethical imperative; it is a constitutional
imperative.
CONCLUSION
Many layers of state and federal laws limit investigators’ freedom
to communicate with willing participants who request the return of
results. To assess the constitutionality of these laws, each of them ultimately will require a separate, evidence-based analysis of the government’s asserted interests and whether the regulation advances
them directly and without unnecessary burdens on speech. This Article has surveyed relevant themes in First Amendment law drawn from
cases that addressed questions similar to those that arise in the context of return of results. These cases suggest that laws and regulations
that restrict the return of results are vulnerable to First Amendment
challenges. This Article has not, however, mounted an evidencebased challenge to specific laws. The duty to produce evidence lies
with those who champion speech restrictions, not on those who question them. It is long past time for the bioethics community and policymakers to produce credible evidence that the harms they conjecture are real; that the government’s interests in addressing these
harms are of a sort that courts, in actual cases, have treated as substantial; that suppressing the speech of research investigators directly
advances those interests; and that no less extensive burden on speech
will work. If—as looks probable—no such evidence exists, then the
bioethics community, with all due respect, needs to retire from the

487
488

St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1981).
See discussion supra Parts III, IV.
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business of suppressing investigators’ constitutionally protected
speech.

